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Lupu: Of Time and the RFRA

OF TIME AND THE RFRA: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
Ira C. Lupu*
Accompanied by great fanfare and the declaration of lofty
principles, the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act 1 (RFRA or the Act) in November, 1993 heralds a turning
point in our national commitment to religious liberty. Taken on
its terms, the Act purports to force a sharp turn away from the
otherwise-prevailing judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause.2 This is no overruling at the margin, in which Congress
builds upon a judicial statement of general principle and legislates to a new result in light of a different view of the facts.3
t
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* Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, National Law Center, The
George Washington University. Thanks to Nancy Gordillo for research help; to Dean
Friedenthal for his commitment to the NLC's summer research grant program which
provided financial support during the preparation of this essay; to Burlette Carter,
Abner Greene, Philip Hamburger, Larry Mitchell, Joshua Schwartz, Ted Sims, Gus
Steinhilber, Bob Tuttle, all of the Montana symposium participants, and to participants in the Workshops at Fordham and George Washington University for helpful
comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. (Gus Steinhilber gets special
thanks for reading the manuscript in the snow in an elk-hunting camp in Northern
New Mexico.) Thanks to Michael Paulsen for suggesting the RFRA/river possibility,
and (posthumously) to Thomas Wolfe for the platform provided by the title of his
last and least successful book. See THOMAS WOLFE, OF TIME AND THE RIVER: A LEGEND OF MAN'S HUNGER IN HIS YOUTH (1935).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
2. Congress has of course overruled Supreme Court decisions before, although
most of them have been statutory constructions rather than constitutional interpretations. For analysis of these episodes, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); see also
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. Q. 425 (1992) (canvassing factors
that lead Congress to override judicial interpretation of statutes, and assessing validity of canons of construction in light of empirical study of such overrides).
3. A number of academic commentators have analyzed that Court-Congress
relationship, typified by various provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. At least
some of that commentary suggested, however, that such legislation might go to the
verge of congressional power in matters in which the states were involved. For the
leading cases on these issues, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970);
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). The most prominent and influential commentary includes Archibald Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Robert Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 81; Archibald Cox, The Role of
Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971) [hereinafter
Cox, Role]; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975); Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995

1

172

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 56
[1995], Iss. 1, Art. 8
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Rather, RFRA rejects wholesale selected aspects of the recent
judge-made law of free exercise, and replaces them with instructions to return to the future; that is, to reemploy doctrines
gleaned from prior law developed in adjudication.4
At the heart of RFRA is a single statutory rule, hinged to a
single exception. The Act's operative section provides:
SECTION 1. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Government shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection
(b).
(b) EXCEPTION.-Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.5
In its reliance on these terms, all of which have developed
judicial antecedents, RFRA effectively returns to the courts the
task of defining the parameters of free exercise law. RFRA is
designed to reject the approach of Employment Division v.
Smith,6 which abandoned strict review of generally applicable

Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1982); Sam-

uel Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed 'Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333 (1982); Stephen L. Carter, The
Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 819 (1986); see also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). I address below the scope of congressional power to fasten
a broad view of religious liberty on the states, see infra part IVA. Professor Conkle's
contribution to this symposium explores this question in greater detail. Daniel 0.
Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an
Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 39 (1995).
4. RFRA is not limited to doctrines the Court has rejected; the Act also codifies at least one arguably pernicious element of extant judge-made law-that involving the problem of what constitutes a "burden" on the free exercise of religion. See
infra parts I.A, II.A, and III.A.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1993). The Findings and Purposes section of
RFRA is located at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; the succeeding sections are numbered
2000bb-1 through 2000bb-4. For the reader's ease, in text and footnotes hereinafter I
will use "Section 1" to refer to RFRA's central provision, instead of the more cumbersome 2000bb-1. In fact, section 2000bb-1 is section 3 of RFRA as enacted in Pub. L.
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (Nov. 16, 1993).
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect
Native Americans who use peyote in religious ritual against criminal prosecution or
loss of unemployment benefits). Congress has quite recently explicitly overturned by
legislation the precise result in Smith. The American Indian Religious Freedom
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laws that cause harm to religious exercise, and to adopt a stringent standard against which to measure the application of government policy which "substantially burden[s]" religious freedom.
Nevertheless, the Act and its history are redolent with purposeful ambiguity concerning the meaning to be supplied to all of
RFRA's critical terms. The result is a delegation of authority to
courts to decide the extent to which they should adhere to their
path of free exercise decisions prior to Smith.7
RFRA may prove to be wonderfully protective of religious
liberty. Seen through the prisms of federalism and power separation, however, RFRA is both unprecedented and distinctively
problematic. In cases in which states rather than the federal
government are the targets of RFRA, the Act raises severe constitutional questions as to the scope of congressional power to
legislate in this way.8 Principles of federalism, most recently
adumbrated in New York v. United States,9 are sharply implicated when Congress overrules the Supreme Court on a matter of
constitutional interpretation and forces the states to comply with
a state-shackling reinterpretation of the law.
Moreover, the entire concept of RFRA is a challenge to the
concept of judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution. On a strong reading of Marbury v. Madison,'0 the idea
Amendments of 1994, enacted in October of 1994, provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation of
peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes is lawful, and shall
not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or
discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession, or transportation, including but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance programs." Pub. L. 103-344, section 2 (adding a new section 3, including the
quoted language at section 3(b)(1), to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act.)
The enactment of this provision is an obvious sign that RFRA itself does not guarantee a different outcome in Smith.
7.
Congress has on many occasions made vague and general delegations to
courts and federal agencies, permitting the Congress to take credit for whatever good
is accomplished while laying blame for the problems caused by the legislation upon
the delegated decisionmakers. Indeed, RFRA's pronounced tendency to earn for its
political supporters maximum benefits while enabling them to deny accountability for
any of the costs will make its structure seem cozily familiar to Congress-watchers. In
the RFRA context, however, the likelihood of judicial rather than administrative
control over most of the details will make it more difficult for individual Representatives and Senators to intervene effectively for constituents with complaints.
8. Professor Conkle's contribution to this symposium provides the fullest development of this point. See Conkle, supra note 3.
9.
112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is."); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958) (Court's interpretation of the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land, and an oath to support the Constitution is equivalent to an oath to comply
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that Congress may replace the Court's view with its own concerning the general rules governing our constitutional arrangements is heretical, a step worse than President Franklin
Roosevelt's attempted Court-packing in its threat to the judicial
role in the interpretation of the fundamental law. RFRA may
thus usher in a transformation in the most fundamental background norms thought to govern Court-Congress relations. 1
I assume that the reader knows the general background and
evolution of RFRA, both from this symposium and prior writings
on the subject. 2 I therefore will not explore in depth the details
of Employment Division v. Smith and the drawn-out legislative
history of RFRA, 3 although I will refer to both from time to
with judicial decisions). Of course, the view expressed in Cooper is not universally
shared. See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen, Book Review, 10 CONST. COMM. 221, 235 (1993)
(reviewing ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992) and arguing that
each branch of the federal government "has a power of legal review over the determinations of the others."); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REV. 211, 291 (1993) (arguing that "We the People are the ultimate
interpreters of the Constitution"). The federalism dimensions of Cooper may make it
a special case. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
11.
Professor Brant's article in this symposium makes a forceful claim that
power separation principles disable Congress entirely from requiring the Court to
adjudicate questions which it has previously held to be essentially nonjusticiable. See
Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at its Word: The Implications for Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995).
At the subconstitutional level, RFRA has intriguing implications for currently
fashionable theories of statutory interpretation. Some judges and scholars argue that
the "plain meaning" of legislation should be the primary guide to statutory construction. Can one follow the plain meaning of an enactment couched almost entirely in
judicially-coined terms? Other approaches to statutory construction emphasize the
relevance of legislative history to the interpretive project. Can such history have any
meaningful role to play in the construction of terms whose origins are in judiciallycrafted opinions? For discussion of these questions in the context of RFRA and the
proposed (but now dormant) Freedom of Choice Act, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 67-76 (1993) (hereinafter
Lupu, Orbits).
12. See Orbits, supra note 11, at 52-66; Douglas Laycock & Oliver Thomas,
Interpreting RFRA, 73 TEx. L. REV. 209 (1995); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994) [hereinafter
Laycock, Free Exercise]; Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221 [hereinafter Laycock, RFRA]; James E. Ryan, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407
(1992); see also Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 230, 273-76 (1994).
13. Three and one-half years expired between introduction of RFRA in the wake
of Smith and the Act's passage. The most significant impediment to passage during
the first half of that period concerned the possibility that the Act might be construed
to protect the right to abortion, even if Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), were to
be overruled. The reaffirmation of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992), effectively removed this impediment. For this part of RFRA's story, see
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time. Rather, this essay will proceed as follows. Part I will
sketch the backdrop of free exercise law against which the RFRA
debate proceeded. In particular, Part I will introduce three crucial themes that echo through pre-RFRA law, RFRA itself, and
the early gloss on RFRA. These themes include 1) what sort of
government imposition on religious exercise is legally cognizable
(the "burdens" question); 2) whether some government enclaves,
such as prisons or the military, are to be excluded from any
constitutional or statutory doctrine of free exercise exemptions
(the "enclaves" question); and 3) how rigorously the "compelling
interest/least restrictive means" standard will be applied (the
"strict scrutiny" question).
Part II will assess these themes as addressed by RFRA in its
pristine form, and focus upon the question of what RFRA "restores"-is it the law as it stood on the eve of Smith, the law at
its high water mark in 1972, or some version still more protective of religious liberty? Part II concludes that the Act, read in
light of its history, is entirely ambiguous as among those choices.
Part III shifts the focus from RFRA pure to the courts' early
gloss on the Act's key provisions. The RFRA case law to date is
characterized by a narrow view of what forms of government
activity impose a cognizable burden on religious freedom, a noticeable vigor in protecting the religious freedom of prison inmates,1 4 and an uncertain version of the Act's "compelling interest/least restrictive means" provision.15
Finally, Part IV assesses the Act against basic constitutional
concerns of power separation and federalism. A broad construction of RFRA maximizes religious liberty, but only at the expense of those structural fundamentals; a narrow construction
achieves less for religious liberty but remains true to structural
norms. Part IV recommends such a limiting interpretation, but
counsels that RFRA's quasi-constitutional quality makes any
particular construction unlikely to endure.

Laycock, RFRA, supra note 12, at 237-43.
14. Because prison life is so heavily and closely regulated that conflict over religious practice is highly likely to occur and because prisoners tend to be litigious,
RFRA may well make a bigger difference in prison than in any other single context.
Indeed, the early RFRA decisions include a very significant proportion of prison cases. For discussion, see infra part III.B.
15.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (Supp. V 1993).
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I. THE PRE-RFRA STATUS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

RFRA purports to "restore" religious liberty to some version
of its pre-Smith status. The Act's operation in time is thus both
prospective and retrospective, applying to the future a set of
norms found in the past. The federal constitutional law of religious liberty,16 however, has never been a simple still life.
RFRA's attempt to capture the pre-Smith legal state by a careful
rendering in 1993 must therefore be examined closely.
For the period between 1791 and 1878, there was virtually
no case law construing the Free Exercise Clause. Unresolvable
doubt may exist about whether, as an original matter, the
Clause supported a theory of free exercise exemptions from generally applicable rules. 7 Beginning in 1878, however, when the
Supreme Court decided Reynolds v. United States,8 a doctrine
akin to that adopted in Smith took root and lasted until 1963.
Reynolds, which affirmed a conviction of a Mormon leader for an
act of bigamy, held that the Free Exercise Clause protected religiously motivated beliefs, but not actions, against general regulation.' s Other than a few interim decisions protecting religiously
motivated speech qua speech,20 nothing disturbed the Reynolds

16. Of course, there is state law on the subject as well as federal statutory law,
such as the prohibition on religious discrimination in employment contained in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Professor Gregory's article in this symposium addresses the relationship between RFRA and Title VII on issues of religious harassment in the workplace. David Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An
Analysis of the E.E.O.C.'s Proposed Guidelines, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 119 (1995). For a
discussion of important post-Smith developments in state law, see Angela C.
Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging PostSmith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 275.
17. Compare Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) (arguing that constitutional history supports the concept of exemptions) with Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 915 (1992) (arguing that constitutional history does not support the concept of
exemptions). Professor Lash has recently argued that the Reconstruction Congress intended by the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Free Exercise Clause to the
states and to extend it to "neutral" rules that burden religion. Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994). Even if he is correct as an original
matter, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), quickly thereafter erased the
prospect of an "exemptions" approach to free exercise adjudication against the federal
government.
18. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
19. Id. at 167.
20. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
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rule prior to the early 1960's. Thus, for the great bulk of our
history, there has been little support in conventional legal materials for a doctrine of free exercise exemptions from generally
applicable law.
Only in the relatively brief period between 1963 and 1990
has the law been otherwise. Sherbert v. Verner2 commenced the
new regime by holding that states could not disqualify Saturday
Sabbatarians from unemployment compensation on the grounds
of being unavailable for work without good cause. Sherbert applied the compelling interest test to this regulatory decision, and
concluded that the state interest in protecting the fiscal integrity
of its unemployment compensation fund was insufficient to overcome the harm inflicted on Mrs. Sherbert's right to choose and
observe her Sabbath.2 2
Sherbert's view of free exercise was powerfully reinforced
and extended in 1972 by Wisconsin v. Yoder,' which held that
the Free Exercise Clause entitled Old Order Amish to an exemption from compulsory school laws for children between the ages
of fourteen and sixteen. In Yoder, too, the Court applied a strict
standard, by which it measured the precise loss to the state's
concern for the education of its youth against the likely impact
on the Amish community if compliance were forced.'
Between Yoder and the Smith decision in 1990, however, the
doctrine of free exercise exemption was well-honored in the
breach. Excepting only a line of unemployment compensation
cases in which Sherbert-like issues were raised,' the Supreme
Court ruled for the government and against the free exercise exemption claimant in every decision rendered between 1972 and
1990.26

290 (1951); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (protecting right of Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse to salute the flag in school).
21.
374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963). For a more comprehensive account of the path to
Sherbert, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933, 939-42 (1989) (hereinafter Lupu, Burdens).
22. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
23.
406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
24. Id. at 221-29.
25. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
26. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978), invalidated a state law exclusion of clergy from holding legislative office. McDaniel, however, is not an exemption
case. The decisions rejecting free exercise claims, all of which occurred in the 1980's,
are canvassed in Ryan, supra note 12, at 1417-29.
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This startling trend, in which the existence of a purportedly
religion-protective doctrine turned out to be no barrier to a long
string of religion-suppressing decisions, had three crucial components-the exemption doctrine's triggering mechanism, its exclusion of certain government enclaves, and the force and focus of
its demand for government justification.
A. The Trigger: The Doctrine of Burdens
A number of decisions avoided the application of any free
exercise review standard by employing a doctrine that religion
must be "substantially burdened" by a government policy before
the exemption doctrine could come into play, and then defining
the notion of "burden" narrowly and formally. The requirement
of "substantial burden" actually originated in Braunfeld v.
Brown," which held that Sunday Closing laws did not inflict
constitutionally cognizable harm on Orthodox Jewish shopkeepers who kept a Saturday Sabbath, because the laws did not directly impede observance of a religious practice. '
Sherbert reinforced Braunfeld's approach by finding a direct
and significant burden on a Saturday Sabbatarian inflicted by a
state unemployment compensation law requiring availability for
Saturday work as a condition for eligibility for benefits. This
condition, the Court said, amounted to a "fine" on Mrs.
Sherbert's Sabbath practices,' and therefore put her to a presumptively forbidden choice between religious compliance and
maintaining her unemployment assistance.
In Sherbert, the "burden" concept had been utilized to expand the notion of coercion to include conditions on government
benefits. In the 1980's, however, the doctrine of "burdens" developed into a claim-excluding device. In Tony and Susan Alamo
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, ° for example, the Supreme
Court rejected a claim for free exercise exemptions from Fair
Labor Standards Act requirements on the commercial operations
of an enterprise with a religious character. The Foundation
claimed that the enterprise's religious and commercial operations
were fully integrated with one another, and that its employees
preferred to work at sub-minimum wage as a matter of religious
commitment. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion characterized the
27.
28.
29.
30.

366 U.S. 599 (1961).
Id. at 605.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-06.
471 U.S. 290 (1985).
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burden of the Act as falling upon nonreligious activity.31 Accordingly, the Court found it unnecessary to apply the SherbertYoder standard to the exemption claim.
The methodological seed planted in Alamo bore larger fruit
in Bowen v. Roy3 2 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,' both of which involved claims by Native Americans that government policies had a deleterious effect on their
religious life. In Bowen, the Court held that strict free exercise
standards did not govern a claim that the government's maintenance of an internal code number on a child's welfare file threatened the child's spirit. Such a claim, the Court reasoned, was an
attempt to impose religious concern on government, rather than
to keep the government from coercively affecting religiously
motivated behavior. 3' And Lyng expanded and clarified the notion of "substantial burden" by relying upon it to exclude from
constitutional cognizance the government's construction of a road
on public property, despite the road's destructive physical effects
upon a Native American holy place.35 Thus, in the absence of
direct and individualized coercion, government action that
harmed religion was not actionable under the Constitution.
The damage to free exercise concerns done by the concept of
burdens has not been limited to decisions in the Supreme Court.
In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education," a widely
publicized piece of litigation, the Sixth Circuit rejected the claim
that the reading requirements in a Tennessee public school system violated the free exercise rights of children and their parents
by forcing upon them an ideology hostile to their religion.3" A
majority of the circuit panel concluded that compulsory exposure

31.
32.

Id. at 300-06.
476 U.S. 693 (1986).

33. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
34. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708-12.
35. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-53. For an additional illustration of the "burden"
concept in action, see Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989).
36. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that requiring Christian fundamentalist schoolchildren to read texts containing ideas that conflict with their parents'
religious beliefs does not produce a cognizable burden on the parents' or the
children's free exercise rights), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
37. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1065. The schoolbook wars are highlighted in STEVEN
BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS (1993) (recounting and analyzing the
conflict over the content of textbooks in Hawkins County, Tennessee, which culminated in the Mozert litigation); George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exer.
cise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 707, 708-10 (1993);
Nomi M. Stolzenberg, 'He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).
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to materials that conflicted with belief was not cognizable as an
injury under the Constitution."8
Of course, the idea that rights under the Free Exercise
Clause be triggered by an objectifiable threshold inquiry is eminently understandable. If these rights are protected by a strong
form of the compelling interest standard, predictable measures of
the right's contours become especially important. 9 As commentators have noted, however, the pre-Smith law of burdens was
quite hostile to religious traditions which are fundamentalist or
expansive in their claims on believers.4' In a predominantly secular world with a pervasive government presence, a wide variety
of seemingly religion-neutral policies will drive up the cost or
contribute to the difficulty of maintaining a thoroughly religious
posture. Moreover, the pre-Smith doctrine of burdens frequently
appeared to operate as one of a set of devices for avoiding application of a religion-protective review standard.41
B. Enclave Exceptions From the Exemption Doctrine
A number of pre-Smith decisions explicitly applied a much
more deferential approach to free exercise complaints in cases
involving highly regulated spheres of life. The most extreme of
these was Goldman v. Weinberger,42 which effectively remitted
38. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1068-70. The Mozert court distinguished the Flag Salute
Case, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), as involving
the more serious wrong of compulsory affirmation. In Mozert, Judge Boggs disagreed
on the burden question, but nevertheless concurred in the outcome on the grounds
that courts should not interfere with local processes of school administration on matters of curriculum and book selection. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1075-81.
39. For an attempt to generalize about the relationship between the trigger for
rights and the standard of review applicable to their infringement, see Alan
Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994). Professor Brownstein focuses most of
his energy on abortion rights and has little specific to say about religious liberty,
which presents distinct problems in this regard. See id. at 900-02 (assimilating free
exercise cases into a general framework of "substantial effects"). Abortion is a singular practice, so that sensible ways may exist to measure the extent to which a regulation impedes access to the procedure. In contrast, religion is a bundle of practices
and beliefs; a legal rule might affect one or more of such practices without substantially disturbing the religion as a whole.
40.
Lupu, Burdens, supra note 21, at 964; Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1258 (1989).
41.
Lupu, Burdens, supra note 21, at 948-60 (discussing various devices for
avoiding the application of strict review to free exercise claims). By temporarily derailing the concept of free exercise exemptions, Smith short-circuited the development
of the burden concept. As will be developed below in parts II.A and III.A, RFRA has
reinstated it with a vengeance.
42. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). For discussion, see generally C. Thomas Dienes, When
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all claims for free exercise exemptions from military regulations
to the unfettered discretion of the Armed Forces. In rejecting
Captain Goldman's claim to be free to wear a yarmulke despite
an Air Force rule prohibiting the wearing of headgear indoors,
the Court in Goldman elevated the military's concern for uniformity over all competing claims for religious diversity, and expressly declined to apply any strict standard of free exercise
review.'
The approach of Goldman-excluding entirely a sphere of
government-controlled activity from the reach of strict free exercise review-was effectively extended the following year in
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz." O'Lone involved a claim by a
Muslim, incarcerated in state prison, for relief from a prison
work schedule that conflicted with his prayer obligations. The
Court in O'Lone held that prison regulations which conflicted
with religious concerns of prisoners were nevertheless to be upheld so long as the regulations were "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."'
This standard, as explained in O'Lone, is "less restrictive
than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights."' It requires courts to consider a
series of factors, including the connection between the restriction
and a legitimate interest of government, the impact of accommodation on the prison system, and the availability of alternative
measures by which the prisoner can exercise his religion. The
O'Lone opinion explicitly rejected, however, a requirement that
government identify regulatory alternatives more accommodating
to religion and then justify rejecting each of them.4 7
The O'Lone standard obviously lies between minimum rationality and strict review, but the decision's tone and outcome left
little doubt that O'Lone was designed to cut back prisoners' free
exercise rights from the pattern that had prevailed in the lower
courts. As a result, those courts perceived the decision as inconsistent with a stance of stringent review of actions by prison

the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other "Special Contexts," 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 779 (1988).
43. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506-10.
44. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
45. Id. at 349 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). This approach
was in precise keeping with the general reassessment of the scope of constitutional
rights for prison inmates, begun earlier in Turner. See also Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401 (1989). Neither Turner nor Thornburgh involved religious liberty.
46. 482 U.S. at 349.
47. Id. at 350.
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officials that conflicted with religious needs of prisoners." So
long as officials could conjure up reasonable-sounding concerns of
security or cost-and the two are always related in the prison
context-they would prevail. Government never had to make any
evidentiary showing that the religious practices that had been
effectively squelched were any real threat to security, nor (more
importantly) did it have to demonstrate that its regulatory measures were narrowly tailored to their concerns, or the least restrictive of religion when compared to the alternatives. Moreover,
the O'Lone standard applied whether the prison regulations were
religion-neutral4 9 or religion-specific.' As a consequence, prisoners rarely prevailed in their free exercise claims against prison
regulations alleged to have deleterious consequences for religious
practices. 5
C. Dilution of the Standardof Review
Finally, and crucially for the construction and operation of
RFRA, a number of pre-Smith decisions watered down the compelling interest test Sherbert and Yoder had employed. It is crucial to an understanding of those cases-and of RFRA, which
references them by name-to parse analytically the components
of the review standard they apply. In both decisions, despite
their widely different context of unemployment compensation
and compulsory education, the Court compared the extent to
which a free exercise exemption would undermine significant state
objectives, with the extent to which enforcement of state law
would impede religious commitment and community. Thus, in
Sherbert, the Court dismissed as utterly undemonstrated South
Carolina's concern that permitting Saturday Sabbatarians to
collect unemployment insurance, despite their unavailability for
Saturday work, would seriously undermine the integrity of the

48. Id. at 352-53. For an account of the highly unsympathetic treatment of free
exercise claims by prisoners in the lower courts after O'Lone, see Geoffrey S.
Frankel, Untangling First Amendment Values: The Prisoners' Dilemma, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1614 (1991).
49.
See, e.g., Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990) (denying a religious exemption from a hair length regulation in prison).
50. See, e.g., Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding direct restriction on Muslim Jumah services).
51.
For a rare exception, see Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991) (holding that prison officials must permit an
inmate to change his name for religious reasons, although the prison remains free to
maintain records in the prisoner's name as it was when he committed the offense for
which he was sentenced (as well as any prior names)).
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unemployment insurance fund, and the Court found meritorious
the claim that benefit loss would threaten an adherent's practice
of sabbath observance.5 2
Similarly, in Yoder, the Court rejected Wisconsin's contention that permitting the Old Order Amish to remove their children from school at age thirteen would undermine the state's
interest in education for self-sufficiency.' After careful review
of the competing claims, including the details of life in the religious community, its customary practices for educating and
training its youth, and the threat to the community that continued school education might present, the Court concluded that the
state's interest was not sufficiently undercut to justify the intrusion on the community's practices of socialization.' 4
This approach to free exercise review, involving a weighing
of respective interests at the margin, was carried forward in a
number of post-Sherbert cases involving a conflict between religious norms and work availability requirements of unemployment insurance schemes.' 5 In these cases, however, stare decisis
more than a concern for religious liberty appeared to control the
outcome.
In a variety of other, quite different contexts, the Supreme
Court (pre-Smith) significantly weakened the stringency of free
exercise review. The leading cases all involve taxation. In United
States v. Lee,56 the Court rejected a claim by a member of the
Old Order Amish that he be free from the obligation to make
employer contributions to the payroll tax imposed as part of the
Social Security system. The claim rested on the ground that "the
Amish believe it sinful not to provide for their own elderly and
therefore are religiously opposed to the national social security
system."57 Lee presented a nice combination of Sherbert and
Yoder; like the former, it involved social insurance and, like the
latter, it involved community practices of the Amish. Nevertheless, without anything resembling careful analysis of the margin-

52. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
53. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-15.
54. Id. at 225-36.
55. See cases cited supra note 25.
56. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
57. Id. at 254-56. Self-employed Amish are exempt by statute from the self-employment tax under the system. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The section, which does not exempt the Amish by sect name but is obviously tailored to
that sect and that sect only, is a religious gerrymander and is constitutionally questionable, especially in light of Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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al costs and benefits reflected in the conflict, the Court cursorily
rejected the exemption claim, citing its general concern for the
threat to the entire federal tax system if religious objections to
taxation were seriously entertained.58
Just one year later, the Court in Bob Jones University v.
United States" repeated this approach in a case involving the
exemption side of federal taxation. Bob Jones University had lost
its exemption as a non-profit educational institution, on the
grounds that it prohibited interracial dating among its students
and therefore violated federal anti-discrimination norms.' With
about the same level of attention and analysis applied in Lee, the
Court summarily rejected the claim that the University, which
had an undisputed religious character, should be entitled to a
free exercise exemption from this application of the tax code's
anti-discrimination policies."1
Here, as in Lee, the real dispute was not about the weight of
the government's interest; rather, the University disputed the
extent to which its rules undermined that interest. Put differently, the University's free exercise claim was that the government's
policy injured the religious community far more than government tolerance of the University policy would have undermined
national anti-discrimination norms. Limited to interracial socializing and not extended to complete exclusion of a racial minority
from the institution, this claim could not be dismissed out of
hand under the free exercise standard applied in Sherbert and
Yoder. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Bob Jones made no
effort to engage in any weighing at the margin as it had in
Sherbert and Yoder.62 Rather, the Court compared the interests
in bulk, and concluded that anti-discrimination concerns

58. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61. Lee might have been made to rest on the narrower
ground that the employees might be non-Amish (although in this case they were in
fact Amish), and the government had a compelling interest in preserving the security
of their retirement or other Social Security benefits. On this theory, moreover, the
government would have a good argument that it should not monitor the religion of
employees, so that it would cease to matter in fact whether the employees were

Amish or not. But the opinion rested on no such ground.
59. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
60. Id. at 579-81.
61.
Id. at 602-04.
62. Concurring in Smith, Justice O'Connor relied on a similarly watered down
standard to reject the exemption claim for those who used peyote in religious rituals.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903-07 (1990). For analysis and critique of
Justice O'Connor's approach, see Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State
Interest: On "Due Process of Lawmaking" and the Professional Responsibility of the
Public Lawyer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1035, 1041-44 (1994).
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outmuscled those of religious liberty.
Thus, between 1972 and 1980, the law of free exercise arguably stood at its high-water mark-the Court had announced a
strict review standard to govern claims, and had not yet created
exceptions or limiting doctrines to funnel claims in a different,
more government-favoring direction. During that period, however, those principles were never put to any test and no Supreme
Court decisions relied upon them.
Between 1980 and 1990, the law became decidedly less favorable to free exercise. The law of burdens and government
enclaves had begun to operate in ways that insulated the government from having to satisfy the compelling interest standard,
and the standard itself had been subtly weakened in Lee and
Bob Jones.' Smith thus pushed matters over the edge, rather
than dramatically changing their character, by essentially returning to the Reynolds doctrine that the Free Exercise Clause
protects beliefs, not actions, and does not privilege religious
conduct against generally-applicable, formally religion-neutral
rules."
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO FREE EXERCISE
DECISIONS

All these devices which limited the growth of free exercise
rights-the doctrine of burdens, enclave-specific exceptions, and
dilution of the compelling interest standard--developed in the
decade immediately prior to Smith. Indeed, the questions raised
by the burdens cases and the enclave cases did not surface prior
to 1985. And though Goldman and O'Lone had highlighted the
exclusion of the military and institutions of incarceration from
the exemptions doctrine, the doctrine of burdens-more generalized and sweeping in its import-had not completely crystallized

63. See also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (the
government's interest in maintaining a sound tax system, uniformly applicable except
as Congress provides, overcomes any argument that the tax code impedes or burdens
religion); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392-97
(1990) (religious organization is not entitled to a free exercise exemption from nondiscriminatory state tax levied on sales of religious items).
64. One might dispute this characterization of Smith in several ways. First, by
formally eradicating the possibility of strict review in most free exercise cases, Smith
weakened the bargaining position of religious interests far more than had the slow
erosion in the ten years prior. Second, as Professor Steven Smith has recently argued, the doctrine of Smith promotes a constitutional discourse less respectful and
tolerant of religious liberty than the prior law had been. Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 519 (1994).
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even by the time of the Smith decision in 1990. Nor had the
decline in the force of the compelling interest test become a subject of general judicial attention and concern. One might fairly
say that when Smith arrived, much of the law of free exercise
was drifting in a slow downward spiral, offering less protection
to religion with every passing Term.
The deterioration of protection for free exercise concerns
between 1980 and 1990 received little congressional attention,
however, save for the response to the 1986 decision in Goldman
v. Weinberger."5 Goldman rejected the claim of a Jewish Air
Force officer to wear a yarmulke despite a military regulation
prohibiting the wearing of headgear while indoors. Congress,
acting pursuant to its power to make rules for the governance of
the armed forces,66 effectively overturned the result in Goldman
by legislation which provided that "a member of the armed forces
may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform ... [unless] the wearing of the item would interfere with
the performance of the member's military duties ... [or] the item

of apparel is not neat and conservative."67 Goldman could be
overturned at little political cost; its facts implicated no real
issue of military discipline and security, and the statutory formula hardly put Congress behind a set of threatening or controversial practices.
The Smith decision in April of 1990, however, produced a
massive outcry." Indeed, the decision invited more generalized
65. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.14.
67.
10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988).
68. For a sampling of the criticism of Smith, see James D. Gordon III, Free
Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 91-102 (1991) (criticizing Smith as,
inter alia, unprincipled); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion
Clauses, 102 YALE L. J. 1611 (1993); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 54-68 (arguing that Smith may result in greater persecution of religious minorities); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1114-28 (1990) (arguing that Smith
misused text, history, and precedent); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 11-26 (1991) (arguing
that Smith is, inter alia, inconsistent with the precedents used by the Court in support). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 308-09 (1991) (defending Smith's outcome but not the
reasoning of the Court's opinion). The complaints were often focused on the general
doctrine of Smith, and not on its particular facts or result. Smith, let us recall, was
a case about the religious use of hallucinogenic substances, and it was decided at the
height of the War on Drugs. As a result, very few critics, and even fewer politicians,
were openly critical of its outcome, which involved denying unemployment benefits to
two Native Americans who had lost jobs as drug rehabilitation counselors because
they had admitted to religious use of peyote. Professor Laycock was one of the few
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(as opposed to outcome-oriented) criticism than any I can remember in the quarter-century in which I have been professionally
interested in Supreme Court decisions. The central criticism was
substantive; Smith is insensitive to religious freedom and the
danger of inadvertent hostility to minority religions. 9 The outcry was more intense, however, because of the decision's glaring
methodological flaws, including disrespect for both the text and
history of the Constitution, judicial innovation without warning,
cavalier overthrow of the most rudimentary concern for stare
decisis, and specious rerationalization of those few precedents
that the Court pretended to take seriously.70
Several Representatives in Congress, backed by a broad
coalition of religious groups and civil liberties organizations,
introduced RFRA in mid-1990 as a corrective to Smith. After a
long struggle over a series of subsidiary issues, the most serious
of which involved the issue of abortion and its possible relationship to religious liberty, the Congress in 1993 enacted RFRA.
The Act opens with congressional findings, inter alia, that (1)
laws neutral on their face toward religion may nevertheless be
as burdensome as laws designed to interfere with religion; and
(2) "the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing governmental interests."71 RFRA's purposes include the restoration of "the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner ... and Wisconsin v. Yoder ... and ... its application in all cases where free

exercise of religion is substantially burdened."72
Recall the Act's operative section:
scholars to emphasize the facts of Smith. See Laycock, supra, at 7-10 (criticizing
Smith for tolerating suppression of a worship service).
For criticism of religious exemptions generally, see Hamburger, supra note 17,
at 932-47 (arguing that constitutional history does not support the concept of exemptions); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 386-88 (1989-90) (arguing that
free exercise exemptions would force courts to evaluate the sincerity of religious beief); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE

DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 591, 600-13 (1990) (arguing that the courts' attempt
to determine free exercise exemptions would be arbitrary and unworkable, and would
lead to fraud, division, and state entanglement with religion).
69. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 68, at 54-68.
70. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 68, at 91-102; McConnell, supra note 68, at
1114-28. Justice Souter emphasized these flaws in his call for reconsideration of
Smith. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2247-50 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
71.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(2), (a)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
72.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
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SECTION 1. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Government shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection
(b).
(b) EXCEPTION.--Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.73
RFRA's language reflects acute awareness of prior judgemade law, and not only on Smith's question of free exercise exemptions from religion-neutral law of general applicability; section 1(a) of the Act expressly incorporates some concept of "burdens" as a trigger to its protection, and section 1(b) represents a
version of strict free exercise scrutiny as the measure of its protection. On enclaves-prisons and military units-the legislative
history is quite vocal, though the Act itself is silent.
Nevertheless, parsing the law into these three components
that had materially contributed to the pre-Smith weakening of
free exercise law-the triggering requirement of "substantial
burden," the exclusion of certain government-controlled enclaves
from the rigors of stringent free exercise review, and the force of
that review-is the most fruitful way to understand the extent to
which RFRA restores pre-Smith law.
A. RFRA on "Burdens"
On its face, section 1(a) codifies the "substantial burden"
requirement.7 4 Unfortunately, the legislative history of RFRA
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
74. Earlier drafts of RFRA expressed this requirement as burden simpliciter.
H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1991), reprinted in Lupu, Orbits, supra note
11, at 87-89. RFRA as enacted ratcheted this up to "substantial burden." This was
done at the request of the National School Boards Association ("NSBA'). See Facsimile Communication, dated April 27, 1993, from August Steinhilber, General Counsel,
NSBA, to Melody Barnes, Assistant Counsel, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights (copy on file with the author and the Montana Law Review.) In the same communication, the NSBA also proposed substituting the language
"narrowly tailored to further [compelling state interests]" for "the least restrictive
means of furthering [compelling state interests]" in RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(2),
but those responsible for drafting RFRA apparently did not accept this change.
Throughout the RFRA debate in Congress, the NSBA had expressed concern lest the
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shows little reason for confidence that the legislators had given
any careful thought to their objectives in doing so.75 The Report
of the Senate Judiciary Committee accompanying RFRA gives
only cursory attention to the burden requirement, and what it
says is echoed, in similarly superficial style, in other elements of
the legislative history. The Senate Report 1) refers to pre-Smith
law as the source of the "substantial burden" requirement,76 2)
concludes that the Act "thus would not require . . . a [high degree ofl justification for every government action that may have
some incidental effect on religious institutions,"77 and 3) explicitly states that RFRA would not overturn Bowen v. Roy or Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, because those two
decisions concerned "only management of internal Government
affairs
or the use of the Government's own property or resourc78
es."
The one concrete example offered in the Senate Report about
how RFRA would work reveals its authors' confusion. In illustrating the interaction of the burden requirement, which excludes "incidental impacts," with the compelling interest standard, a footnote in the Report claimed: "For instance, the act
does not prohibit neutral and compelling land-use regulations,
such as fire codes, that may apply to structures owned by reli-

law of religious liberty be altered in ways that interfered unreasonably with public
school administration. See, e.g., Letter from Michael Resnick, NSBA to Senator Orin
G. Hatch, May 5, 1993 (expressing concern about the impact of RFRA on public
school libraries, public school labor relations, regulation of home schooling, and compulsory school attendance requirements) (copy on file with the author and the Montana Law Review).
75.
As will be seen in part III.A infra, the lower courts have struggled with the
meaning of this highly important statutory concept. It is the trigger for RFRA's protection, yet Congress paid almost no attention to it and offered little in the way of
aids to construction.
76.
S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1993). The section-by-section analysis of RFRA in the Senate Report is even less helpful; it merely restates the burden
requirement. Id. at 14-15. The Senate Report of the House Judiciary Committee on
RFRA repeats the same themes, with no supporting analysis. See H.R. REP. NO. 88,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1993). The House Report stated:
All government actions which have a substantial external impact on the
practice of religion would be subject to the restrictions in the bill ....
It is the [House Judiciary] Committee's expectation that the courts
will look to free exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith
for guidance in determining whether or not religious exercise has
been burdened .. ..
Id.
77.
S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1993).
78. Id. at 9 & n.19; see also 139 CONG. REc. S14,470 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993)
(statements of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Grassley).
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gious institutions but have not [sic] substantial impact on religious practices."79 This misapprehends the Act's operation in
several ways. First, RFRA's rule is focused on applications of
law, not against general policies on their face. If application of a
fire code provision precluded the use of particular flammable material in the creation of an altar or religious scene, that might
well constitute a burden of some sort on a religious practice."
Second, the footnote example merges the operation of
RFRA's rule in section 1(a) with that of the exception in section
1(b). If the application of a particular fire code provision does not
have a substantial impact on religious practices, RFRA does not
require the provision's purposes to be compelling, nor does it
require the provision to be the least restrictive means for accomplishing those purposes. If the application of these codes furthers
compelling interests in fire prevention, and does so by the least
restrictive means, it makes no difference if the code's impact constitutes a substantial burden. Religion loses if section 1(a) is not
triggered, or if section 1(b) is satisfied. The Senate Report's illustration, which runs together without a missed beat RFRA's rule
and the exception to it, does not inspire confidence that its authors knew or cared about the difference between them."'
To be sure, RFRA needed a "trigger;" that is, it required a
gatekeeper rule concerning what sort of conflict between the
state and the religious liberty claimant would result in RFRA
protections. The rule that had developed in pre-Smith law, however, had been substantially criticized, had no ardent defenders,
and was part and parcel of the decline (not the restoration) of
religious liberty.82 Only insensitivity to Native American faiths,
which had borne the brunt of the development of the doctrine of
"burdens,"' can explain why Congress selected this formulation."
79. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 n.18 (1993).
80.
For example, precluding the use of hay in a Christmas manger scene might
interfere with the scene's authenticity.
81. Nor does it suggest they had the slightest idea about how the compelling
interest test is designed to work, or how it did work in Sherbert and Yoder. See
supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
82. The commentary suggests alternative theories, even if the case law does
not. See Lupu, Burdens, supra note 21 (suggesting an approach to burdens guided by
common law principles, equality principles, and entitlement principles); Michael W.
McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedam, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38-45 (1989) (analyzing burdens in terms of substitution
effects and disproportionate impact on believers).
83.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
84. The legislative history bears this out. See S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st
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B. The Question of Separate Enclaves
The enclaves problem presents a legislative history quite
different from that reflected in the general concept of burdens.
The Act itself makes no special mention of prisons, the military,
or any other enclave under government control. Nevertheless,
the issue of the Act's application in prisons became the eleventh
hour obstacle to its enactment. Having slept for the three years
between RFRA's initial introduction and the eve of its passage, a
group of state attorneys general and prison administrators
launched a last minute move to exclude prisons from RFRA.
Backed by Senators Simpson and Reid, this effort came to a floor
vote in the Senate and was defeated by a vote of 58 to 41.85
As is reflected in the gloss on RFRA adumbrated below, the
courts have uniformly concluded that RFRA applies with something resembling full force within prisons as well as without. The
Act's history, though cautiously hedged, supports this general
conclusion. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports accompanying RFRA make quite explicit that the Act would overturn O'Lone.' Overruling O'Lone, however, does not itself guarantee that RFRA's operative provisions will have the same
meaning inside prison and out. Courts may yet defer to some
extent to prison administrators when they offer prison security
justifications for regulations that restrict religious practice.
Unsurprisingly, RFRA's legislative history is mired in ambiguity on the extent to which courts are to substitute their judgment for prison administrators concerning free exercise questions. The House Report seems the most favorable to prisoner
claims:
Sess. 8-9 & n.19 (1993) (noting that the Committee expects pre-Smith law to guide
courts on what constitutes a "substantial burden," and noting, without express approval or disapproval, that pre-Smith law includes the decisions in Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693 (1986), and Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988)).
85. 139 CONG. REC. S14468 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993). The Reid Amendment's
purpose was "to prohibit the application of [RFRA] . . . to an individual who is incarcerated in a federal, State, or local correctional, detention, or penal facility." 139
CONG. REC. S14461. Senator Simpson had raised this issue in the Summer of 1993
in the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee. To his credit, Senator Simpson
gave this issue far more careful analysis than the Committee gave to the Bill as a
whole. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-38 (1993).
86. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10; H.R. REP. NO. 88, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8. Both Reports similarly make explicit that the Act overturns Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), and will require some form of close review of free
exercise claims in the military.
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Pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the
courts must review the claims of prisoners and military personnel under the compelling governmental interest test. Seemingly
reasonable regulations based upon speculation, exaggerated
fears [or] thoughtless policies cannot stand. Officials must show
that the relevant regulations are the least restrictive means of
protecting a compelling governmental interest. However, examination of such regulations in light of a higher standard does
not mean the expertise and authority of military and prison
officials will be necessarily undermined. The Committee recognizes that religious liberty claims in the context of prisons and
the military present far different problems for the operation of
those institutions than they do in civilian settings. Ensuring
the safety and orderliness of penological institutions, as well as
maintaining discipline in our armed forces, have been recognized as governmental interests of the highest order.8 7
The Senate Report is somewhat more favorable to prison
officials because it omits the reference to "least restrictive
means":
The committee does not intend the act to impose a standard that would exacerbate the difficult and complex challenges
of operating the Nation's prisons and jails in a safe and secure
manner. Accordingly, the committee expects that the courts will
continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience
and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order,
security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs
and limited resources.
At the same time, however, inadequately formulated prison regulations and policies grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to
meet the act's requirements.
The committee is confident that the compelling interest
standard... set forth in the Act will not place undue burdens
on prison authorities. Instead, it reestablishes a standard that
is flexible enough to serve the unique governmental interests
implicated in the prison context. Accordingly, the committee
finds that application of the act to prisoner-free exercise claims
will provide a workable balancing of the legitimate interests of
prison administrators with the Nation's tradition of protecting
the free exercise of religion.

87.

H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1993).
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For all these reasons, the committee concludes the first
amendment doctrine is sufficiently sensitive to the demands of
prison management that a special exemption for prison free
exercise claims under the act is unnecessary. The act would
return to a standard that was employed without hardship to
the prisons in several circuits prior to the O'Lone decision. The
standard proved workable and struck a proper balance between
one of the most cherished freedoms secured by the first amendment and the compelling governmental interest in orderly and
safe operation of prisons.'
These discussions are, of course, hopelessly abstract. Neither
Report provided a single example of a religious practice that
could have been suppressed under O'Lone but would not survive
RFRA. Moreover, neither Report suggested any religious practices that RFRA would protect in civil society, but that could be
suppressed in prison under some greater degree of deference to
prison administrators than civil administrators. The most one
can say with confidence from RFRA pure is that: 1) the question
of RFRA in prisons was given explicit consideration; 2) the Congress rejected a prisons exception from RFRA; and 3) RFRA is
designed to impose a standard stricter than that of O'Lone, but
the ways in which it is to be stricter are not specified. Presumably, prison officials now must meet a burden of persuasion
concerning the reasons for suppression and the costs and dangers of nonsuppression, beyond that which O'Lone had imposed.
C. The Force of Strict Review
Section 1(b) permits government to burden religious exercise
by demonstrating that the state's action:
"(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 89

88. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1993). Floor debate in the
Senate had a similar flavor. Senator Hatch, for example, argued in support of RFRA:
Third, the compelling State interest test outlined in RFRA is an appropriate
test for challenges to religious liberties. It has proven to be a workable
balance between the interests of prison administrators and the more limited
rights of prisoners. Contrary to what some have suggested, prison officials
clearly have a compelling interest in maintaining order, safety, security, and
discipline. The sponsors of this bill have emphasized this point repeatedly.
CONG. REC. S14465 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V 1993).
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The relationship between the formulation in section 1(b) of
RFRA and the pre-Smith law of free exercise is unclear, to say
the least. Although section 1(b)(1) tracks some version of the
prior law, it does not specify the extent to which the burden on
religious exercise must further the state's interest. This leaves
open the question whether RFRA requires Sherbert-Yoder review, in which interests are weighed at the margin, or Bob Jones
review, in which interests are weighed in gross."
Unlike section 1(b)(1), which could be read consistently with
either the weaker or stronger version of the earlier law, section
1(b)(2) is far more limiting of government than any prior free
exercise decision of the Supreme Court. The kicker in section
1(b)(2) is the adverb "least." Although both Sherbert and Yoder
contain some language concerning alternative means,91 neither
decision required anything like a showing that the government's
choice of means was "least" restrictive compared to all possible
alternatives. Both decisions determined that making religious
exercise subject to a particular choice of means, otherwise acceptable in non-religion cases, caused too grave a harm to religion with too little corresponding benefit to government.92

90. See supra part I.C.
As I testified in May of 1992 before the Subcommittee on Civil and Consti91.
tutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary:
"You will search the Supreme Court's opinions in Yoder and Sherbert in vain
for the language proposed in [section 1(b)]. Although both decisions require the state
to serve important interests in order to overcome free exercise claims, neither adopts
a standard as stringent as the Act proposes." The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 380-81 (1992)
(statement of Professor Ira C. Lupu). See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (burdens on free
exercise may be justified by a "compelling state interest," citing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 ("We must . . . consider whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies the substantial infringement of
appellant's First Amendment right."); id. at 407 (government must "demonstrate that
no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights."); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion"); id. at 221 ("we must searchingly examine the [state] interand the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing
ests ...
the claimed . . . exemption"). None of these formulations require the government to
use the "least restrictive means" to achieve the objectives of the law from which free
exemption is sought.
92. Typically, a search for less restrictive means involves investigation into
whether government has regulated constitutionally preferred activity so sweepingly as
to require facial invalidation of the policy. For example, a prohibition on all
leafletting is an overbroad method for controlling street litter; the government must
make do with the means, less restrictive of speech, of a prohibition on littering. In
such a case, the leafletting restriction is void in toto. See Schneider v. New Jersey,
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Under section 1(b)(2), however, the inquiry is different, and
the government will be very hard-pressed to prevail if the provision is construed straightforwardly. RFRA is only triggered when
religious exercise is regulated coercively. Government, however,
will virtually always have the option of addressing its concern
either less coercively, or noncoercively, to those whose religion is
burdened by coercive means. For example, revenue collection
laws might be enforced only by civil suits rather than criminal
penalties against those with religious objection to some programs
of taxation.93 Less restrictive still, supporting government might
be made voluntary for those whose religious exercise is burdened
by compulsory support of the state.
In the revenue example, the suggestion that the government
use entirely noncoercive means seems absurd, because we do not
anticipate that many people will pay taxes voluntarily. Moreover,
we reasonably fear that a large volume of fraudulent claims of
religious exemption from taxation will appear if such exemptions
are recognized. No one would expect that RFRA or the Constitution would be construed to mandate such a result. But that is
simply another way of saying that the requirement of "least
restrictive means" cannot sensibly be made part of the law of
free exercise exemptions; the results are consistently too onesided. Unless the inquiry also takes account of the probability of
the "least restrictive means" being nonefficacious, a question that
RFRA does not address, the RFRA claimant is highly likely to
prevail.
RFRA, literally construed, would thus insulate religious
exercise far beyond its most stringent protection in the prior law.
If government is truly required to employ the means least restrictive of religion, without regard to the loss to the state in
attaining its objectives, the Act would significantly "over-restore"
religious liberty in two distinct ways. It would exceed all prior
law protection, and it would frequently be insensible.
As if in recognition that section 1(b)(2) cannot really mean

308 U.S. 147 (1939); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating as
overbroad a requirement that public school teachers disclose all of their organization-

al affiliations). For the test of "less drastic means," Shelton relied on Dean Milk Co.,
v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349 (1951), which had utilized a test of less drastic means in a dormant commerce clause context. 364 U.S. at 488, n.8.
93. This is not fanciful. The Vermont Supreme Court recently made such a ruling under RFRA in the context of child support enforcement. Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d
843 (Vt. 1994) (holding that RFRA bars a contempt citation against a parent who
refuses on religious grounds to comply with a judicial order of child support, but
does not protect the parent against civil enforcement of the underlying order).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995

25

196

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 8
MONTANA
LAW

REVIEW

[Vol. 56

what it says, other sections of RFRA muddy the water by providing apparent reference points for the construction of section 1(b).
In the Act's earlier incarnations, it was at least internally consistent on what that external reference was to be. Sherbert v.
Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, representing the high-water
mark for free exercise law, were to be the guideposts. The version considered in the House in 1991 and 1992 provided:
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF
PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing governmental interests.
(b) PURPOSES.-The purposes of this chapter are(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is burdened ....
Late in the legislative process, however, and without explanation in the legislative history, the formal findings were rewritten to declare that "the compelling interest test as set forth in
prior federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.""5 The purposes section of RFRA was not similarly rewritten to reflect the shift from the incorporation by reference of Sherbert and Yoder to incorporation of unspecified prior
federal court rulings.
Because Sherbert and Yoder are far more stringent than the
collected body of federal court rulings, especially the more recent
ones from the Supreme Court, RFRA as enacted is internally
inconsistent. Perhaps the inconsistency should be resolved by the
notion that "Purposes" trump "Findings"; the latter are assess-

94. H.R. REP. No. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991), reprinted in Lupu,
Orbits, supra note 11, at 87-89.

95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). The General
Counsel for the National School Board Association suggested this change in conversation with House personnel, and the coalition of groups supporting RFRA acceded to
the change. Telephone conversations of October 21, 1994 and October 31, 1994 between the author of this article and August Steinhilber, General Counsel, National
School Board Association. For additional information concerning Mr. Steinhilber's
impact on RFRA, see supra note 74.
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ments of pre-enactment conditions, while the former are statements of legislative objectives. But why would Congress "find"
that prior federal court rulings represent a "workable test for
striking sensible balances" and then declare its purposes to include the adoption of the most strenuous version of that test to
be found among those rulings? Presumably, restoring the most
strenuous version would result in protecting religious liberty
beyond the point of "sensible balance" with government interests.
On the other hand, restoring the body of "prior federal court rulings" would force into the Act all of the pre-Smith damage to free
exercise values. Arguably, this latter approach would significantly underprotect--"under-restore" if you like-religious liberty.
RFRA is thus ambiguous in very basic ways about the force
to be given its operative provision." Section 1(b)(1) can be read
with varying degrees of stringency. Section 1(b)(2) includes a
requirement that government employ the "least restrictive
means" each time it substantially burdens religious exercise.
That requirement, construed as written, will make it extremely
difficult for government to prevail. The text of section 1(b)(2) is
stronger than RFRA's declared purposes, which in turn are
stronger than RFRA's most relevant finding. 7
This is a dizzying collection of possibilities about the meaning of a central provision in RFRA. Nothing in the legislative
history works to resolve the ambiguity created by the tension

96. This point is crisply put in Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct,
61 U.Cm. L. REv. 1245, 1307-08 (1994). Professors Sager & Eisgruber are expanding
their critique of RFRA in a forthcoming article, Why RFRA Is Unconstitutional, xx
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
97. One additional last minute change in RFRA might also weaken the force of
section 1(b). The enacted version requires government to show that the challenged
action is "in furtherance" of a compelling interest; earlier versions had required that
the challenged action be "essential to" such an interest. H.R. REP. No. 2797, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1991), reprinted in Lupu, Orbits, supra note 11, at 88. This
change, too, is the product of a suggestion from the National School Board Association. See supra notes 94 & 74.
In the House Report on RFRA, Representative Hyde and several of his Committee companions asserted that this change, taken together with the change in the
findings section discussed above, directed the Act toward restoring free exercise law
to its condition on the eve of Smith, rather than to its high water mark in 1972.
H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 14-16 (1993). Another ambiguity lurks
behind the formulation, found in both the purposes section and the findings section,
of the test "as set forth" in the various legal loci identified. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb(a)(5), (b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). As all beginning law students learn, the standard
"set forth" in a given opinion is not necessarily the standard in fact applied. RFRA
might thus be construed to employ the standard set forth in Sherbert and Yoder as
that standard was thereafter applied in weakened terms.
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between "findings" and "purposes," or the still greater tension
between the operative section and the set of findings and purposes designed to illuminate that section. Section 1(b) of RFRA is
destined to bedevil courts and cries out for a narrowing construction of the sort I suggest in subpart IV.B, below.
D. Conclusion
In its pristine form, RFRA has delegated a series of broad
and crucial questions to the courts for resolution. First, what
shape should the requirement of "substantial burden" take in the
RFRA universe? Should its prior unsatisfactory development
simply be continued, or should its thrust be reevaluated? Second,
if (as seems to be the case) Congress has overruled O'Lone and
obliged the courts to protect the religious freedom of state and
federal prisoners, what degree of deference should be given by
judges to prison administrators? Third, given the wide range of
possibilities, what force should the test of "compelling interest/least restrictive means" be given, especially in those cases
arising in civil (rather than prison or military) society?
III. THE RFRA CASE LAW

Unsurprisingly, RFRA-watchers did not have to wait long for
the early returns on these questions. All three have surfaced in
significant ways in the early case law concerning RFRA. As of
this writing, there have been over fifty decided cases in which
RFRA has been mentioned; in over thirty of these, RFRA played
some part in the outcome. A number of the decisions have rejected claims on the basis that the alleged impact on religion did not
constitute a "substantial burden";98 that is, the RFRA threshold
is currently quite high. As if to bear out Senator Reid's and Senator Simpson's concerns about the impact of RFRA on a litigious
prison population, about half of the decided cases have involved
regulation of religion in prisons.9 The version of the compelling
interest test that has surfaced in the early decisions is not uniformly strenuous.0 0 In particular (and unsurprisingly), the requirement of "least restrictive means" at times is downplayed.
Most intriguingly, several decisions have revealed a tendency
toward a flexible view of RFRA's operative provision, in which

98.
99.
100.

See infra part III.A.
See infra part III.B.
See infra part III.C.
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the weights of the burden on religion and the opposing state
interest are viewed in relation to one another.1 °'
A. The Meaning of "SubstantialBurden"
As the pre-Smith law of burdens developed, the only kinds of
government action that qualified were either direct and coercive
restrictions on religious practice, °2 direct and coercive compul10 3
sions of practices antithetical to religious belief and custom,
and entitlement conditions which required direct surrender of
religious freedom."° Other sorts of government practices that
made religious fidelity more onerous or difficult were not constitutionally cognizable." 5
The pattern in the RFRA cases thus far is starkly in line
with the narrow trend represented by the pre-Smith burden
cases. A few RFRA cases involve impacts upon religious practice
that appear burdensome by any stretch of the prior law and the
imagination. For example, a federal district court found sufficiently burdensome the application of a D.C. zoning law to prevent a church from carrying out its religious mission of feeding
the hungry by operating a kitchen for the homeless.' 6 Another
federal district court held burdensome a restriction imposed by
prison officials upon the wearing of beads, which prisoners
claimed their religious beliefs required.' 7 And, in an echo of
the unconstitutional conditions analysis at the heart of Sherbert,
a federal district court held a requirement that state employees
take an oath to support the state and federal constitutions to be

101. See Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994) (dismissing a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by a high school theology
teacher whose contract was not renewed by the Archdiocese). The court in Powell
suggested that church autonomy in religious affairs was a core religious interest, and
could not be trumped by ADEA interests. See also Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693
(D. Ariz. 1994) (upholding application of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act of 1994 against religiously motivated protest, in part on the ground that the
government has an overriding interest in preventing intimidation of women seeking
reproductive services, and that the opposing interest, even if religious, is weak.)
102.
See, e.g., California v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (invalidating application to Native American Church ritual of prohibition on peyote use).
103.
Yoder is an obvious example of this pattern.
104. Sherbert and its progeny involving unemployment compensation are examples of this.
105. See supra part I.A.
106. Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adj. of the Dist. of Columbia, 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994) (granting application for preliminary injunction),
permanent injunction granted, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994).
107.
Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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substantially burdensome to the religious convictions of two
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses. 10 8
The early decisions have rejected, however, a number of
other claims as falling short of a substantial burden on religious
exercise. Only one of those appears easy, involving a complaint
by a prisoner that his transfer from one facility to another resulted in his receiving cold kosher food rather than the hot kosher food he had formerly received, with no accompanying showing that the laws of Kashrut (or the prisoner's own religious
commitments) required food to be heated.0 9
In a number of more difficult cases, courts have rejected
RFRA claims on the grounds that the complainant had not demonstrated a "substantial burden" on religious exercise. One important group of such cases involves the problem of discrimination against religion generally or against a particular sect. At
least one pre-Smith decision in the Supreme Court held that
such discrimination triggered the Free Exercise Clause;
McDaniel v. Paty"' invalidated a state prohibition on clergy
serving in the legislature.
In RFRA cases, however, McDaniel has lacked legs. A district court in the District of Columbia held that it was not a
substantial burden on a Catholic university for the United States
Commerce Department to exclude the university's radio station
from federal grants because the station broadcasts a religious
service each week.' And in a case involving a state prisoner
in Pennsylvania, a district court held that a prison regulation
forbidding inmates to form groups and hold group meetings without prior approval from prison authorities did not substantially

108. Bessard v. California Community Colleges, No. Civ. S-93-1439-WBS/JFM,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16362, at **23-30 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
109. Prins v. Coughlin, No. 94 Civ. 2053 (MBM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10564
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1994).
110. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Cf Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (sectarian
discrimination in regulation of fundraising by religious sects violates the Establishment Clause). Larson could have rested with equal force on the Free Exercise
Clause; the state had helped one group of sects at the expense of another group.
Surely that "burdened" the latter by putting them at a comparative disadvantage in
the raising of funds. The legislation invalidated in Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1993), involved a purer establishment
clause problem, because it favored one sect without directly disfavoring any other.
111. Fordham University v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684, 700-01 (D.D.C. 1994). The
Department rested this exclusion on a general policy of refusing to subsidize religious
activity. For a discussion of whether the Department might justify such a blanket
discrimination against religion as resting on the "compelling interest" of satisfying
the Establishment Clause, see infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
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burden the religious freedom of an inmate who led a religious
sect in prison.'
In several other cases, legal rules have been applied to the
direct and material detriment of religious exercise. In each, however, courts concluded that the effect was insufficient to qualify
as a substantial burden. In In re Faulkner,113 for example, a
bankruptcy court held it was abuse of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition for the debtors to list as a necessary expenditure a tithing to their church of $300.00 per month. The debtors believed
such tithing was required by the Bible, but the court conclusorily
dismissed the argument that its bankruptcy rule concerning religious contributions "substantially burdened" the debtors' religious exercise." 4
Similarly, in Vernon v. City of Los Angeles," 5 the Ninth
Circuit rejected a claim that a departmental investigation of the
Assistant Police Chief, triggered in part by reports of his socially
conservative religious views, constituted a substantial burden on
his religious freedom. The investigation had ultimately cleared
112.
Boone v. Commissioner of Prisons, No. 93-5074, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10027 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1994); see also Merritt-Bey v. Delo, No. 93-2194, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14892 (8th Cir. June 17, 1994) (allegation of unequal allocation of resources and facilities among religious groups by prison officials insufficient to constitute a "substantial burden" under RFRA). But see Allah v. Menei, 844 F. Supp. 1056
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (official nonrecognition of Temple of Islam sect, partly on grounds
that the prison already recognized Nation of Islam sect, triggers the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). The issue of "substantial burden" did not receive full treatment
in Allah v. Menei.
113.
165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
114. Id. at 646-47; see also Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re
Young), 152 B.R. 939 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) (bankruptcy trustee may set aside
tithing contribution to church made by insolvent debtors within one year prior to
filing bankruptcy petition), appeal docketed, No. 93-2267 (8th Cir. 1993). In Christians, both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court acted prior to enactment of
RFRA, and the parties have addressed the impact of RFRA only on the appeal. The
United States Department of Justice filed an Intervenor's Brief in the Eighth Circuit
in Christians, and then, on order of the White House, withdrew the Brief on the day
of the oral argument. See Gustav Niebuhr, Justice Department Withdraws Brief in
Tithing Case, N.Y. TIMES, September 16, 1994, at B, 18 (Late Edition - Final). In the
brief as originally filed, the United States argued that the relevant bankruptcy provision merely operates against assets that are deemed to be held in trust for creditors,
and therefore are not the debtor's property. Based on this reading, the brief argued
that the scheme works no substantial burden on the debtors. The brief also argued
that the recoupment by the trustee furthers a compelling interest, and that no less
restrictive means are available to achieve it. For discussion of this latter point, see
infra text accompanying notes 133-35. For pre-RFRA analysis of problems like those
raised in Faulkner and Christians, see Donald R. Price & Mark C. Rahdert, Distributing the First Fruits: Statutory and Constitutional Implications of Tithing in Bank.
ruptcy, 26 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 853 (1993).
115. 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Vernon of various misconduct charges, but he alleged that he
was discouraged by the investigation from consulting with
church elders and engaging in proselytizing while off duty. The
court held that, even if true, these allegations fell short of a substantial burden, and that Vernon's more general allegations that
he had been chilled in the exercise of his religion by the investigation were similarly noncognizable under the Act." 6
The developing case law on the issue of what constitutes a
"substantial burden" discloses no consistent theory-indeed, very
little theory at all-through which the concept should be understood. The decisions barely bother to acknowledge the Supreme
Court decisions on what constitutes a burden. The closest any of
them comes to a general approach is the suggestion that burdens
must include a direct legal prohibition against conduct religiously required, direct legal compulsion of conduct religiously forbidden, or the conditioning of an important benefit upon infidelity
to religious commitment.117 This view, of course, is the narrow
one that religious exercise is burdened only by the combination
of legal coercion and religious duty. Such a view is notoriously
insensitive to religions rooted in customary practices, rather
than obligation." 8

116. Id. at 1399-400; see also Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846 (3rd
Cir. 1994) (allegations that public officials impeded the access of a religious group to
the location of the group's tent revival meeting are insufficient to state a case of
.substantial burden"); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994) (holding that
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 does not substantially burden
abortion protesters' religious freedom, because they allege no religious duty to physically obstruct or intimidate persons seeking reproductive health services); accord,
Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994). Both Riely
and Council for Life Coalition also hold that the government has a compelling interest in stopping obstructive abortion protests, so that the "no burden" holdings were
not dispositive in these cases.
117.
Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1393-95; see also Bessard v. California Community Colleges, No. Civ. S-93-1439-WBS/JFM, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16362, at **23-30 (E.D.
Cal. 1994) (conditioning state employment on willingness to take an oath to support
the constitution burdens religious conviction of those conscientiously opposed to
oathtaking).
118.
It is also insensitive to the relationship between financial pressure and
religious exercise. This problem, foreshadowed by the Alamo Foundation decision, see
supra text accompanying notes 30-31, surfaced recently in Germantown Seventh Day
Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia, No. 94-1633, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12163
(E.D. Pa. August 26, 1994). The City's Department of Licensing and Inspection had
ordered the Church to stop work on an addition to its premises on the ground that
the plans failed to comply with requirements concerning available parking spaces for
nonresidential uses in a residential district. The district court rejected a RFRA complaint against the Department, on the ground that the "[Church] has utterly failed to
show that anyone's freedom of religion was affected, let alone 'substantially burdented],' by the City's zoning provision." Id. at *5. What if the Church could show
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Indeed, Yoder itself could not withstand a view so pinched.
Although the Old Order Amish parents did assert that salvation
required a life apart from worldly influence, they were not strictly obliged by their faith doctrines to withdraw their children
from school at the teenage years. 9 They did so only because
the experience of high school attendance threatened the imposition of values inconsistent with Amish ways. 20 It thus cannot
be true to RFRA's restorative purpose for courts to read the
"burden" requirement so as to require explicit conflict of legal
and religious precept. Unless the courts attempt to work out a
coherent and religion-sensitive theory, 2 ' RFRA's remedial aims
will inevitably be stifled.
B. RFRA in Prison
The only consensus to date in the RFRA cases concerns its
application in prison. Although there have been disagreements
concerning the particulars of the review standard to be applied,
every court that has considered the question has come to the
conclusion that RFRA overrules O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz and
requires at least some scrutiny of the importance of state interests offered to suppress religious practice and of the availability
of more accommodating alternatives.'22
Several distinctive qualities appear in the early RFRA prison cases. First, at least thus far, those courts that have given the
most sustained attention to the question of whether RFRA overrules O'Lone have relied explicitly on the legislative history in
reaching an affirmative conclusion."2 Second, only one of the

that the cost of compliance meant its addition had to be reduced in size, with a
corresponding loss of space for worship, religious education, or other religious uses?
119. 406 U.S. at 209-212.
120. Id.
121. I set forth my own pre-RFRA theory of burdens in Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 966-82
(1989). That article develops a set of interrelated ideas designed to keep the concept
of burdens from resulting in discrimination against any particular brand of religious
tradition. In particular, the Article advocates relying on common law principles, concepts of equality, and concepts of entitlement property to measure when the state
has committed a constitutionally cognizable wrong against religious exercise.
122. See Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Elkins, No.
93-15185, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4293 (9th Cir. March 2, 1994); Campos v. Coughlin,
854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Rust v. Clarke, 851 F. Supp. 377 (D. Neb. 1994);
Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Allah v. Menei, 844 F. Supp.
1056 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
123. Campos, 854 F. Supp. at 205-07 (relying on the language and structure of
the statute as a whole, and using legislative history to reinforce the conclusion that
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prison decisions has even hinted at an awareness that RFRA's
displacement of O'Lone might be in excess of congressional
power. 2 4 State attorneys general are apparently only beginning
to wake up to the possibility of raising the question of state immunity from such federal intrusion.'25
A large issue remaining in the prison cases is the extent to
which the burden of justification is lighter on prison officials
than other state officers in defending religion-neutral rules with
a burdensome impact on religion. Suggestions appear at several
places in the legislative history to the effect that the RFRA review standard will be adjusted by courts to take account of the

the Act was designed to replace the deferential review of O'Lone with the Act's more
stringent standard); Allah v. Menei, 844 F. Supp. 1056, 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (relying
explicitly and exclusively on the House and Senate Reports).
124.
Campos, 854 F. Supp. at 204 n.7. In Campos, which had reached only the
preliminary injunction stage, Judge Sotomayor refused to pass on the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the States, in part because she concluded that the
challenged practice would violate the Free Exercise Clause in the absence of RFRA.
She expressed doubt that the prison officials could persuade her that "Congress may
not provide greater protection [than courts have] to the rights recognized in the
Constitution." Id. As I will argue in part IV of this article, the argument that Congress may not expand rights in this way is much more substantial than the Judge
perceives. See infra subpart IV.A.
Moreover, I think Judge Sotomayor only half right in her conclusion that the
plaintiffs would prevail in the absence of RFRA. Campos involved a state prison
directive aimed explicitly at the wearing of religious beads by prisoners. Prison officials feared these beads were being used to signal gang affiliation or activity among
prisoners; the complaining prisoners were Santerians who presented a well-documented case of religious practice in wearing strings of colored beads. The judge is surely
right that, in the absence of RFRA, this would not be a case controlled by Smith;
Smith is about religion-neutral, generally applicable rules, and the directive challenged in Campos was on its face religion-specific. However, she may not be right
that application of O'Lone and other pre-RFRA prison precedents would lead to invalidation of the challenged directive. Those cases required restrictions on prisoners'
liberty to be "reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives," and the same
standard applied whether or not the prison rule was religion-neutral. See supra text
accompanying notes 85-88.
If reasonableness in the O'Lone sense does not require an evidentiary demonstration of the threat to security, the prison officials would probably have prevailed
pre-RFRA. Their expertise and judgment about the use of beads to signal gang connection would have been sufficient to justify their Directive. Judge Sotomayor, however, required a stringent evidentiary showing of a security threat from the wearing of
religious beads. Campos, 854 F. Supp. at 209. RFRA requires such a showing, whether or not the Directive is religion-neutral. Thus, the constitutionality (and construction) of RFRA ultimately should be dispositive in Campos.
125. Professor Brant's and Professor Conkle's articles in this symposium, together
with part IV, infra, all offer suggestions for how such efforts might proceed. In an
appeal involving a state prisoner, the Virginia Attorney General has raised the question of RFRA's constitutionality. Cochran v. Morris, (4th Cir.) (No. 94-6014) (briefs on
file with the author and the MONTANA LAW REVIEW).
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special security concerns of prisons.128 This no doubt represents
a congressional concern to have made an effort to restore religious freedom, even in prison, but not to appear to have imposed
any significant costs on society in having done so. It would not
be difficult to make a prison-specific adjustment in section 1(b);
for example, courts might accept more readily in prison cases
than others official assertions that proffered "less restrictive
alternatives" are so costly or dangerous that RFRA cannot reasonably be read to impose them. Whether this gloss on RFRA
will develop remains to be seen."2 7
C. Strict Review Under RFRA
As demonstrated above, RFRA's section 1(b) has the potential for real bite. 28 In particular, section 1(b)(2)'s requirement
that the state employ the "least restrictive means" when it burdens religious exercise will frequently require: 1) a presumption
against sweeping prophylactic rules; 2) tradeoffs between
achievement of the state's goals and protecting religious exercise;
and 3) acceptance of greater risk that evils with which the state
is concerned may occur.
Cheema v. Thompson1 29 illustrates the lower courts' struggle with the inquiry into "least restrictive means." In Cheema,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California held that a public school could forbid children who belonged to the Khalsa Sikh sect from wearing to school a knifelike instrument ("kirpan") as required by their religion. 3 ' The

126. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
127. Such a construction might be seen as meeting some of the federalism concerns described in part IV, infra.
128.
See supra part II.C. This potential is well illustrated in Professor Paulsen's
contribution to this symposium. Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through it: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 249 (1995).
129. No. F-94-5360-GEB-DLB (E.D. Cal. May 27, 1994), rev'd and remanded, No.
94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th Cir. September 2, 1994).
130.
The District Court described the religious practice and other relevant facts
as follows:
Plaintiffs are several minor and adult Khalsa Sikhs who reside in
Livingston, California. The Sikh religion was established in India approximately 500 years ago and was developed through the teachings of ten great
Gurus between 1500 and 1700. The last of these Gurus, Gobind Singh,
founded a separate order of Sikhs known as the Khalsa. This new order of
Sikhs emphasized bravery and discipline and was formed in response to
discrimination and persecution against the Sikh faith.
Initiated Khalsa Sikhs are required, as a sign of their devotion, to
bear on their person at all times five items known as the "five Ks". These
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court's opinion carefully elaborates the school district's strong
interest in excluding students carrying deadly weapons, and in
punishing as delinquents or criminals those students who violate
the ban. But the court treats in the most conclusory way the
possibility that the school district might permit the children to
carry the knives under an arrangement, proposed by the Cheema
family, which would reduce (though hardly eliminate) the risk
that the presence of the knives would cause difficulties in
school.13 '
Part of the explanation for this failure to consider seriously
the availability of less restrictive means, as RFRA requires,
arises from the court's conclusion that the school's interest in
safety simply "outweighs" the family's interest in following this
particular religious custom.'32 Although this analysis tracks the
m it
approach to interest-balancing exemplified by Bob Jones,"
does not fit comfortably with the language of section 1(b)(2).
The district court's leap to this form of gross interest balancing, and its related failure to consider alternative means of protecting the school's interest while permitting accommodation of
religious exercise, led to a reversal in the Ninth Circuit just

items are a symbolic reminder of the various aspects of the Khalsa Sikh
faith and consist of: "kas" (long hair); "kangha" (a comb); "kachch" (special
undergarments); "kara" (as steel band); and the "kirpan" (literally, a
"sword"). The kirpan is a symbol of self-respect, freedom from oppression
and the triumph of spiritual knowledge. The sword has theological roots in
the Sikh understanding of God's retribution and justice
Rajinder, Sukhjinder and Jaspreet Cheema are students in the
Livingston Union School District [first, third, and fifth grade, respectively]
who were baptized, or initiated, as Khalsa Sikhs in December 1993. Prior
to their baptism, these children were instructed on the obligations of the
Khalsa Sikh order, including the obligation to wear the five K's at all
times. They were advised that the kirpan is not to be considered a toy or
used as a weapon short of a life or death situation; that it is to be worn in
its sheath and should be removed only for certain religious observances.
Cheema v. Thompson, No. F-94-5360-GEB-DLB, slip op. at 2-3, (E.D. Cal. May 27,
1994).
131. The U.S. District Court in Cheema described the arrangement as follows:
Plaintiffs proposed certain limitations which they would observe if allowed
to wear kirpans at school. Under that proposal the kirpans worn to school:
1) would not exceed 7 inches in overall length; 2) would not have blades
longer than 4 inches; 3) would have the handle sewn or otherwise attached
to the cloth strap making its removal from its sheath more difficult; and 4)
would be worn under the clothing at all times and not knowingly shown or
displayed to others while on school property.
Id. at 4, n.3.
132. Id. at 25-26.
133. See supra part I.C (comparing interest balancing at the margin with interest balancing in bulk, and arguing that Bob Jones employs the latter methodology).
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before school began in September.3 In an unpublished opinion, the circuit panel ruled that RFRA imposes an evidentiary
burden on government to demonstrate that no less restrictive
alternative exists. Here, the panel concluded, the district court
had not required any such evidentiary showing. Moreover, other
school districts in California had worked out accommodations
with the Sikhs, including dulled knives and sheath constructions
that made it very difficult to remove the knife for use. The panel
ordered the district court to supervise or create an accommodation that would permit the Cheema children to attend school
pending a full trial and resolution of the dispute."5
Cheema at least involves a state interest of real gravity. The
potential trivializing of the compelling interest test is suggested
by cases involving the treatment of tithing contributions to
churches by persons who thereafter file for discharge of their
debts in personal bankruptcy. In Christiansv. Crystal Evangelical Free Church,3 ' now on appeal in the Eighth Circuit, the
trustee (ironically named Christians) argued successfully that a
tithe effectuated in the year prior to filing the bankruptcy petition could be set aside and the amount recovered from the
Church for inclusion in the bankrupt's estate to pay creditors.
The district court, affirming the bankruptcy court's decision, held
(pre-RFRA) that Employment Division v. Smith barred an exemption to section 548(a)(2), which permits a bankruptcy trustee
to recoup certain contributions made by debtors within one year
of filing for bankruptcy and while the debtors were insolvent. 37

134. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160 (9th Cir.
September 2, 1994).
135. Judge Wiggin, while agreeing that the district court had failed to inquire
into "least restrictive means," dissented from the panel ruling, concluding that there
may be no "feasible means to accommodate the Cheemas' need to carry kirpans" and
that "[tihe majority's instructions to the district court impose greater restrictions on
the states . . . than those set forth in [RFRAI." Id. at *17. Judge Wiggin's disagreement with the others on the panel reflects the ambiguity of RFRA's section 1(b)(2).
See supra part II.C. For another example of a significant struggle with the force of
section 1(b)(2), see Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843 (Vt. 1994) (holding that RFRA bars a
contempt citation against a parent who refuses on religious grounds to comply with a
judicial order of child support, but does not protect the parent against civil enforcement of the underlying order).
136. 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992), affd, 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993);
see also In re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644, in which the bankruptcy trustee argued that
tithing was not a reasonably necessary expenditure for a debtor, allowing him to deduct the tithe from the resources available to pay creditors; as recounted above, see
supra text accompanying note 113, the court held that the trustee's choice did not
impose a "substantial burden" on the debtors' religious exercise.
137.
Christians, 152 B.R. at 951-55; see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2),(1988).
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In its now-withdrawn brief as intervenor on appeal to the
Eighth Circuit, however, the United States had argued that
section 548(a)(2) is the least restrictive means to further the
government's compelling interest in protecting the property
rights of creditors over the free exercise interests of debtors and
their religious community." 8 Perhaps the original position of
the United States was consistent with Lee and other cases of the
1980's, in which the compelling interest test had been weakened.
But, as the government belatedly appeared to recognize, it was
surely not consistent with Sherbert, which itself involved competing financial interests. The now-abandoned government position,
if adopted by the Eighth Circuit, would seriously undermine
RFRA's potential to protect religious exercise from any but the
most trivial of government policy concerns. 3 9
One thematic question about section 1(b) that has already
arisen several times and is likely to recur pertains to the
government's interest in combatting discrimination of various
kinds, and the weight of that interest when juxtaposed against a
claim of religious freedom to discriminate. Recall that the Supreme Court gave only cursory treatment to such a religious
liberty claim in the Bob Jones case, 140 and there is every reason
to expect that the conflict in Bob Jones ultimately will be replicated in a broad variety of anti-discrimination claims against
religious organizations.' 4'

138.
See Brief for Intervenor The United States at 31-40, Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church (8th Cir.) (No. 93-2267). For details of the withdrawal, see
supra note 113.
139. The brief for the United States also misconceived of the test of "least restrictive means." It rejected the argument, advanced by the debtors, that section 548
recoupment should be limited in tithing cases to situations involving a demonstrated
intent to defraud creditors. This result, claimed the government, would undermine
one purpose of section 548, which is to prevent an insolvent debtor from diverting
assets which are deemed to "belong" to all his creditors. Id. at 37. That conclusion
may be correct, but it fails to recognize the multiplicity of purposes in section 548,
and the possibility that some of those purposes may be weightier than others. Preventing fraudulent transfers may be more important than simple preservation of
assets. Permitting tithing as an exemption from section 548, at least in those cases
in which the debtor can easily rebut any presumption of fraud by demonstrating that
the tithing has occurred on a regular and consistent basis in the past, may be the
"least restrictive means" to achieve the anti-fraud purpose of section 548 while preserving religious freedom.
140. See supra part I.C.
141.
The Georgetown University Gay Rights case, which pitted gay student
groups relying on the District of Columbia Human Rights Act against the University
and its reliance on the Constitution, is a good example of such a dispute. Gay Rights
Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). The Georgetown litigation
concluded prior to Smith and the enactment of RFRA.
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Although RFRA decisions have not yet involved a claim of
religious freedom to engage in discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, several state courts have grappled with a closely
related question. In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,"' the Alaska Supreme Court held that the state had a
compelling interest in applying its laws prohibiting housing
discrimination based on marital status to a real estate agent who
refused to show or rent apartments to an unmarried couple (a
man and a woman). Swanner premised this refusal on his Christian religious beliefs that such cohabitation was sinful and immoral."" The Alaska Court, in its original opinion, rejected
Swanner's free exercise claim.'" In a modified opinion issued
in light of the enactment of RFRA, the court reaffirmed its original result; the court concluded that combatting marital status
discrimination was a compelling interest, and that the state had
available no means less drastic than an outright prohibition to
accomplish it.'
In Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,'"
however, a California appellate court reached precisely the opposite conclusion on highly similar facts. " 7 Mrs. Smith had refused to rent to an unmarried couple, and had rested her objection to the California anti-discrimination law on the federal Free
Exercise Clause, the state constitution's religious liberty provision, " 8 and (in later stages of the litigation) on RFRA. The

142.
874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994) (per curiam), cert denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3345
(U.S. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 94-169).
143.
874 P.2d at 276-77.
144.
868 P.2d 301 (Alaska 1994) (relying on Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990)).
145. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282-84. That conclusion, based on the Court's assessment that the state had crucial interests in ensuring housing for all and an end to
discrimination based on "irrelevant characteristics," was strenuously challenged in a
dissent by Chief Justice Moore. Id. at 286. The Chief Justice argued that race and
gender discrimination were constitutionally distinguishable from marital status discrimination, and that the state's interest in preventing the latter was relatively trivial compared to either of the former. Id. at 287-89. Justice Thomas expanded on this
theme in his opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Swanner. 63 U.S.L.W.
3345 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 94-169).
146. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
147.
Mrs. Smith owned the properties in question, while Mr. Swanner was an
agent and manager for the property owners. Neither Swanner nor Smith appeared to
be an occupant of the premises that the complainants had tried to rent.
148. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 399, 410. An earlier decision in the California appellate system had reached the same result based on
the state constitution alone, but the California Supreme Court later "depublished" it.
See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed as improvi-
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court held that all three of these sources supported Mrs. Smith's
exemption claim, and ruled in her favor. It concluded that
California's interest in enforcing a prohibition on housing discrimination based on marital status was insufficient to overcome
Mrs. Smith's right to conduct business in fidelity with her religious beliefs." 9
Decisions like Swanner and (California) Smith raise difficult
questions under RFRA. Discrimination has both instrumental
and symbolic consequences. Perhaps, as the Smith court concluded, few unmarried couples in California will experience this
difficulty (although one wonders why the legislature enacted the
provision in the first place), and the Mrs. Smiths of the state
control a tiny percentage of the housing stock. But discrimination is about insult and psychic injury as well as access to goods,
and the state's interest in avoiding those harms may be very
strong indeed.
In the case of discrimination based on sexual orientation,
which may be more widespread than discrimination of the
Swanner and Smith sort, graver questions of stigmatic injury
may arise, and the likelihood that such discrimination will cause
a real problem of access to housing seems significantly greater.
Moreover, renting an apartment to those engaging in conduct
thought "sinful" by the property owner or rental agent is a far
cry from engaging in the conduct itself, so the religious interests
advanced in these cases may be rather weak. On these questions, the issue of whether RFRA requires the weighing of interests to be at the margin or in bulk looms particularly large.'

dently granted and remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); see also Attorney General v.
Desilets, 636 N.E. 2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (remanding for a factual hearing on the magnitude of state interests of a landlord's claim, based on RFRA and both state and
federal constitutional law, that he be free to discriminate against unmarried couples
seeking to rent from him).
149. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 410-12.
150. See supra parts .C and 1I.C. A good deal may turn on whether religious
institutions rather than individuals acting alone are involved, and what kinds of

decisions they are making. For an example of religious liberty as protected by RFRA
trumping equality concerns in a context in which the religious claims are strong and

the equality argument below the apex, see Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D.
Colo. 1994) (dismissing a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by
a high school theology teacher whose contract was not renewed by the Archdiocese).
Powell involves issues of church autonomy in religious affairs, and so implicates
religious freedom very strenuously; see also EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding on constitutional grounds that courts cannot review
an employment discrimination claim against the practices of the Canon Law department of a church-affiliated and religiously oriented university). For still another variation on the theme of equality versus religious freedom, see Riely v. Reno, 860 F.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/8

40

19951

Lupu:TIME
Of Time&and
the RFRA
OF
THE
RFRA

211

Additionally, RFRA's section 1(b) will force a confrontation
with government claims that it must exclude religion from certain benefits by force of the Establishment Clause. In Fordham
University v. Brown, 5 ' a federal district court upheld the Commerce Department's policy of excluding from a particular grant
program those applicants who plan to engage in religious activity
with the facilities subsidized by the grant. In particular, the
Department disqualified Fordham from eligibility for a grant to
support its radio station, which broadcast a Mass each Sun"' In addition to ruling that this exclusion did not constiday. 52
tute a substantial burden, the court concluded that the policy of
exclusion was designed to satisfy the Establishment Clause, and
that the government had a compelling interest in so doing."
Decisions like that in Fordham University, which have their
non-RFRA counterparts," highlight the constitutional and
statutory tensions generated by what I have called "The Lingering Death of Separationism."'55 Doctrines of equal access for
religious groups to public resources 56 have begun to undercut
Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994) (upholding application of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1994 despite the enactment of RFRA, in part on the ground that
the government has a compelling interest in preventing intimidation of women seeking reproductive services); accord, Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp.
1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994). For competing (pre-RFRA) scholarly views on whether religious
institutions should be afforded the same rights as religious individuals under the free
exercise clause, compare Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981) (arguing for a broad doctrine of institutional autonomy
for churches) with Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions:
The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987) (opposing such a
doctrine). Up to the limits of federalism and Establishment Clause concerns, RFRA
may protect institutional religion more than the Free Exercise Clause alone.
151.
856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994).
152.
Id.
153. Id. at 694, 697.
154.
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269
(4th Cir. 1994) (upholding, on Establishment Clause grounds, state university's refusal to allocate funds to student organization with religious purposes), cert. granted,
No. 94-329, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 7531 (Oct. 31, 1994).
155.
See Lupu, supra note 12.
156.
The leading decisions are Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Westside
Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); and Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). All of these decisions
have involved space in public buildings, rather than money. Whether there should be
a constitutional difference between space and money is arguable. The distinction
might actually cut in favor of more room for money grants than space grants; the
use of public space by a private religious group is more likely to create the appearance of state endorsement than the same group's use of public money. On the other
hand, unrestricted government grants of money may permit religious groups to engage in religious proselytizing at government expense. Subsidized proselytizing strikes
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the separationist premises which animate policies like that attacked in the Fordham University case. However reasonable such
policies may once have been, government cannot have a compelling interest in satisfying an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that is no longer the law. Whatever discretion government possessed pre-RFRA to insist upon exclusion of all religious beneficiaries from certain programs, RFRA will certainly
accelerate both the attacks on that discretion and its likely demise.
D. Conclusion
RFRA's early gloss can be succinctly described. The decisions
thus far have produced significant agreement only on the proposition that RFRA ends what was effectively an enclave exemption for prisons. Beyond that, the opinions reveal disarray, borne
in the Supreme Court's pre-Smith free exercise rulings of the
1980's, on the meaning of RFRA's rule and RFRA's exception.
There are many routes to unifying and improving upon this
record, and presumably the Supreme Court will have to confront
the hard questions of interpretation raised by a statute that
embodies judicially-created concepts whose meanings have been
evolving over time. As the next and final part of this article
demonstrates, however, RFRA raises serious issues concerning
the power of Congress to so regulate the states, and these questions may be of crucial import in the judicial choices among the
various options for construing the Act's operative section.
IV. FEDERALISM, POWER SEPARATION, AND RFRA

A. ConstitutionalDoubts Concerning the Power to Enact RFRA
Proper construction of RFRA's key provisions would be difficult enough without major issues of constitutional structure
lurking in the background. After all, the statute involves a
unique combination of legislative adoption and rejection of prior
judge-made law. Under such circumstances, issues of statutory
construction present special problems. Judges cannot ascertain a
plain meaning for legislative language drawn from judicial opinions set in a particular factual context. Moreover, judge-made
law is implicitly dynamic in meaning, taking on new coloration
as it is applied in new circumstances. Is RFRA to be similarly
at a tender Establishment Clause nerve.
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dynamic in its evolving meaning, or is the meaning to be "fixed"
by some understanding of what constitutes a "substantial burden" or "compelling interest" as Congress may have understood
those terms in 1993?
These questions are complicated considerably by the constitutional doubts concerning congressional power to force state
governmental compliance with RFRA. For purposes of constitutional analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between application
of RFRA to the federal government and application to the states.
With respect to the former, Congress presumably has affirmative
power to protect religious freedom; whatever power authorizes
the underlying legislation will support an accommodation of
religious liberty as part of the legislative scheme. Thus, for example, congressional power to establish a postal system entails
power to operate a system of personnel to run the system, which
in turn supports the power to accommodate the religious needs
of those personnel. The analysis is similar for federal prisons and
the Armed Forces; congressional power to create these institutions entails power to accommodate religious concerns within
them. The limits on such accommodation arise not from lack of
affirmative power, but from whatever constraints the Establishment Clause and the rest of the Bill of Rights impose.'57
It will be constitutionally most difficult to justify RFRA in

157.
What those limits might be is very controversial. Compare Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation
of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991) (arguing for strict limits on legislative
power to accommodate religion) with Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992)
(arguing for broad power to accommodate). My argument, in Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, against legislative accommodation contemplated sect-specific or
practice-specific accommodation, and not legislative return of the entire project of
accommodation to the courts, where I argued it belonged in the first place. Lupu,
supra, at 599-611. See also Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation
of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L. J. 1691 (1988); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion
Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75 (1990).
Professor Brant's article in this symposium suggests an entirely different set of
limits, drawn from separation of powers, on Congress's authority to require federal
judicial determinations concerning accommodation of religion. Brant, supra note 11.
My problem with Professor Brant's argument is that, if accepted, it would leave state
courts free to interpret RFRA while disabling all federal courts (including the Supreme Court) from doing the same. This result would do violence to the Supreme
Court's role as the unifier of a supreme federal law. For discussion of related questions in other contexts, see William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263 (1990);
Brian A. Stern, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal Case or Controversy Re.
quirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 77 (1994).
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those cases in which the Act operates directly on institutions of
state government. In such cases, the recent resurrection in New
York v. United States'5 of a constitutional bar to federal commandeering of state institutions to do federal work portends
grave doubts about RFRA. New York v. United States invalidated
a piece of federal legislation which gave states the "choice" to
either regulate, according to federal directions, the disposal of
low-level radioactive wastes generated by various industries
within the state, or take title to the wastes and suffer whatever
liability might attach to their owner.'59 This, the Supreme
Court concluded, was an unconstitutional appropriation of the
machinery of state government to implement federal policy.'
Does the principle of New York v. United States apply to
RFRA? RFRA, indeed, substantively coerces states into respecting religious liberty, within state institutions, as a matter of
federal policy. Moreover, the Act has an express provision for
attorney's fees,' 6 ' and expressly authorizes "appropriate relief
against a government" 62 to effectuate its policies. Injunctions,
backed by the contempt power, and money damages in appropriate cases, are likely to be the judicial methods for enforcing
RFRA. Faced with these consequences of noncompliance, state
agencies are highly likely to internalize RFRA norms by enacting
policies of accommodation of religion thought to be required by
federal law.
The application of RFRA to state institutions might be excluded from the principle of New York v. United States by virtue
of the Court's emphasis on the explicit requirement of legislative
action, but this factor probably cannot bear that much weight.
The constitutional policies upon which New York v. United States
depends do not turn so strenuously on which level of state government is the target of coercion. To be sure, a federal command
that the states legislate appears to be the most significant inva-

158.
112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
159. The provision was included as part of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (Supp. III 1985).
160. The Act, the Court said, "commandeer[ed] the legislative processes of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.' 112 S. Ct. at 2420 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). All six Justices who joined in New York v.
United States are still on the Court; two of the three dissenters (Blackmun, White,
Stevens) have retired. This suggests longevity for the principle.
161.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. V 1993). The fees provision applies to judicial
proceedings and federal administrative proceedings.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c).
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sion of state political sovereignty, but commands to state agencies similarly make the states an intermediary in the implementation of federal policy. And prior opinions from those in the New
York majority have made clear that the distaste for federal coercion of states extends to congressional orders to state regulatory
agencies as well as to state legislatures.163
If this account of recently restored federalism principles is
correct, the only escape for RFRA from the problem of New York
v. United States resides in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has made clear, states cannot be
sovereign to enforce laws and commit acts which violate the
Constitution.'
Thus, if Congress legislates to correct Fourteenth Amendment violations, states have no grounds on which
to resist.
But what if Congress legislates to forbid state activity that
the Supreme Court has declared explicitly does not violate the
Constitution? Is this not precisely the relationship between Employment Division v. Smith and RFRA? The former sweepingly
holds that generally applicable, religion-neutral rules do not
trigger strict free exercise review; the latter legislatively declares
the precise opposite, with interdiction of policies acceptable under Smith the obvious consequence.
Supreme Court precedent on the scope of congressional power to expand the guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments
offers less comfort to RFRA supporters than might initially appear to be the case. First, the most sweeping pronouncements
about the scope of congressional power to expand constitutional
rights came almost thirty years ago, from a Court far less concerned about federalism than the current one.'
Second, the
broadest vindication of federal power to expand constitutional
protections against the states have all come in the area of race
relations and/or voting rights, two topics at the heart of the Reconstruction Amendments. 6 '
163. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting
from holding that Congress may require state public utility commissions to consider
certain factors in state utility regulation). At several places in its New York opinion,
the Court described the vices of federal compulsion of state regulation, without distinction between legislative regulation and administrative regulation. 112 S. Ct. at
2424, 2429-32, 2434-35.
164. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976) (stating that state
sovereignty is no bar to enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, because Section
5 of the Amendment limits state sovereignty).
165. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
166. Professor Conkle's article provides a detailed account of the Court's expan-
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Indeed, the strongest and most recent decision supporting a
broad view of congressional power to expand the Reconstruction
Amendments is in the precise context of race and voting power.
City of Rome v. United States,"7 decided in 1980, held that
Congress could require preclearance by the United States Attorney General of state and local election law changes which had
the purpose or effect of diluting the voting power of racial minorities, despite the Court's same-day holding that the Fifteenth
Amendment of its own force only prohibits election laws which
purposely discriminate against racial minorities. 1 In City of
Rome, however, the Court explicitly found a conceptual linkage,
rather than a contradiction, between its view of the Fifteenth
Amendment and the congressional expansion of that view. Relying on the coverage formula in the Voting Rights Act, which
required preclearance only in those states with a history of intentional race discrimination in voting, the Court held that "Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral
changes by jurisdictions with [such a history] create the risk of
purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that
have a discriminatory impact." 69
Relying on findings of this sort is a sensible way of marrying
legislative competence with judge-made interpretations of the
Constitution's governing principles. Quite wisely, Professor
Laycock urged the House Judiciary Committee to rely on a similar theory in overturning Smith in RFRA; 17 ° that is, he suggested that Congress make a finding that religion-neutral laws that
burden religion may in some cases be the product of covert hostility toward religion, and he encouraged a separate finding that
burdensome impacts be outlawed because of the difficulty of
proving intentional discrimination against religion.
Because those findings seemed implausible, less plausible
than comparable findings in the voting rights context, or for
some other unstated reason, Congress ignored Professor
Laycock's advice in enacting RFRA. It made no such findings.

sive treatment of congressional power to expand the voting rights of racial minorities
against the states, and an excellent analysis of why the rationale of that effort is
unlikely to extend to the concerns of RFRA. Conkle, supra note 3, at 46-55.
167. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
168.
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
169.
446 U.S. at 177.
170. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 357-58 (1992) (Statement of Professor Douglas
Laycock).
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Nor does RFRA only apply in those jurisdictions which have a
demonstrated history of official religious intolerance. Without
such predicates, RFRA rests nakedly on a substitution of a legislative rule (albeit one that judges first announced) for the prevailing judge-made rule under the Constitution. The threat this
presents to the Court's Marbury function-declaring the meaning
of the Constitution--cannot be blinked away.
Moreover, there is every reason to expect that Congress will
get less leeway when it tries to enforce a Bill of Rights provision
against the States than it receives when it enforces a core concern of the Reconstruction Amendments. Provisions of the Bill of
Rights, including the Free Exercise Clause, apply to the states
only by way of the mongrel doctrine of selective incorporation."' Although the Reconstruction Amendments have been
read to authorize Congress to prescribe remedies for state violations of the Bill of Rights, courts have never extended this authority to empower Congress to define the substantive rules
under the various provisions which2 the Supreme Court has selected for application to the states.'
171.
Selective incorporation as developed by the courts does not purport to rest
on any originalist theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. No Justice who has supported selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment has
ever defended that posture on originalist grounds, and it has been devastatingly
criticized on those grounds. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172-83
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Professor Akhil Amar has defended on historical
grounds a rather different theory of selective incorporation (which he calls "refined
incorporation"). His theory offers new and different meanings for the selected amendments as applied to the states. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 1193 (1992). Professor Kurt Lash (a former student of
Professor Amar) has argued quite specifically that the Reconstruction Congress intended to apply the Free Exercise Clause to the states and to extend it to "neutral"
rules that burden religion. Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1106 (1994). Professor Lash's argument focuses heavily on the reconstruction urge to
protect religious freedom among emancipated African-Americans, and does not persuasively demonstrate any intention to protect religious exercise against neutral rules
outside of that racial context. For a different response to Professor Lash, see STEVEN

D.

SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 50-54 (1995) (suggesting that an incorporated, mid-19th century
view of religious freedom might have overtones of a "Christian America").
172.
The Supreme Court has held Congress has power to establish remedies and
procedures that attach to all Fourteenth Amendment rights, including those carried
to the states by the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94
(1978) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to authorize an award of attorney's fees against
a state official for inflicting acts of cruel and unusual punishment barred by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist dissented in
Hutto, arguing that congressional power to legislate in regard to incorporated rights
is not the same as the power to protect the rights included explicitly in Amendments
13-15. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Several commentators rely explicitly
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Doubts about the wisdom of recognizing such a power are
reinforced, moreover, by the problem of federal self-interest in
redefining the Bill of Rights. The Bill, unlike the Reconstruction
Amendments, was originally designed to limit Congress, and it
seems constitutionally backwards to give Congress a primary
role in shaping such limitations. Recognizing broad congressional
power over the meaning of the First through the Eighth Amendments, however, may have that precise consequence."'
The other theory supporting congressional power to overturn
Smith has been advanced elsewhere,"' and is tackled by Professor Brant in this symposium.'7 5 This theory treats Smith as
institutional rather than substantive; that is, as resting on a
judicial judgment of its own institutional noncompetence to balance religious liberty against state interests. On this view, perhaps Congress can insist that courts engage in such balancing,
especially if there is a reasonable argument that the Constitution requires some agency of government to do so and that Congress is in the best position to decide which agency that should
be. This theory eliminates the state sovereignty problem because
the theory assumes that the states lack the sovereign power to
injure religion in ways that Smith permits but RFRA forbids.
However, the institutional theory exchanges the federalism problem for a dilemma of power separation; in particular, the theory
is in tension with recent judicial pronouncements that Congress
cannot expand the standing limitations imposed on courts by Article III. 1

on Hutto in asserting that Congress has the same power with respect to incorporated
rights as it does for others. See Laycock, RFRA, supra note 12, at 246; Matt Pawa,
When The Supreme Court Restricts ConstitutionalRights, Can Congress Save Us? An
Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029,
1095-97 (1993). Neither of these commentators, however, grapple with the substanceremedy distinction. Even assuming the correctness of Hutto, extending congressional
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to substantive revision of First Amendment norms requires independent justification. For additional elaboration of the argument that Congress cannot revise the meaning of Bill of Rights provisions as applied
to the States, see Conkle, supra note 3, at 70-71.
173.
This theme is advanced in Robert Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic
Marriage, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 81, 132.
174. See Lupu, Orbits, supra note 11, at 59-62; Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With
Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743, 757-59 (1992) (raising and rejecting the
argument that Smith makes free exercise exemption claims nonjusticiable); Laycock,
RFRA, supra note 12, at 252-54.
175.
Brant, supra note 11.
176. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (holding that citizensuit provision in federal statute cannot make up for complete absence of concrete
injury from challenged government action). Professor Brant's article elaborates further
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B. The Consequences for RFRA Construction
The constitutional arguments against extension of RFRA to
the states may, of course, simply lead to a holding that it cannot
be applied to force states to accommodate religion beyond the
point encompassed by the Supreme Court's free exercise decisions. Alternatively, these constitutional concerns may produce
constructions of RFRA that pull it back from the broadest possible reach, and therefore minimize the constitutional tension it
creates. 77 The Supreme Court's prominent decision in Gregory
v. Ashcroft,"'5 applying a policy of explicit statement to decide
whether federal statutes should be read to authorize intrusions
on core functions of state government, is a subconstitutional
companion to New York v. United States and a strong support
beneath an argument for a limiting construction.
The least worthy candidate for this kind of construction
device is RFRA's inclusion of state prisons. RFRA itself does not
explicitly overrule O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz. But the last minute flurry over-and defeat of-the Reid Amendment, which
would have exempted prisons from RFRA,179 and the various
references in the committee reports of both Houses of Congress
to the need to overturn O'Lone,'" should be more than enough
to satisfy the Gregory requirement that Congress contemplated
the impact of the legislation on particular state institutions.
Moreover, the congressional decision to overturn O'Lone is,

on the notion that Congress may be disempowered to overturn the Court's assertion
of its own noncompetence to adjudicate free exercise exemption claims. For additional
development of this view, see Professors Sager & Eisgruber's forthcoming article, Why
RFRA Is Unconstitutional, xx N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
177. Courts have wide leeway in which to construe federal statutes so as to save
them from invalidation. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 63 U.S.L.W.
4019 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1994) (broadly interpreting scope of scienter requirement in child
pornography statute so as to eliminate constitutional doubt); Edward J. Debartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
(courts should construe statutes to avoid unconstitutionality "unless such construction
is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"). This device is an important aspect of
Court-Congress partnership in the development of constitutional law, and is an important and often overlooked part of our constitutional tradition.
178. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
179. Introduction of the Reid Amendment in the Senate in October 1993 was accompanied by a letter of support from a large number of prison administrators from
all around the U.S., 139 CONG. REC. S14355-56 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993). Attorney
General Reno and a dozen state attorneys general opposed this amendment and
expressed support for RFRA. Id. at S14351-52.
180. See supra part II.B.
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at least in general terms, supported by evidence of an inquiry
into, and judgment concerning, legislative facts relevant to the
prisons question. In particular, the Senate Report analyzes the
problem of religion in prison in considerable detail,"s' and the
RFRA debate in the Senate focused extensively on the subject.
Evidence that Congress explored the appropriate balance between prisoners' religious needs and legitimate security concerns
of prison officials should help buttress the congressional judgment that RFRA's substantive provisions should apply to state

prisons."'
The prisons issue, however, is the easy one; it is parasitic on
the more difficult problem of construction of section 1(a)'s
"substantial burden" requirement, and the most difficult problem
of construction of the "compelling interest/least restrictive
means" provision in section 1(b). That is, if Congress may impose
the RFRA rules upon states generally, it presumably may extend
those rules--a fortiori, a slightly weaker version of those
rules' 8 3 -to prisons. What version of those rules might courts
conclude Congress may impose, and has so imposed, upon the
states?
With respect to "substantial burden," I expect that courts
will track the legislative history and conclude that Congress
meant for courts to proceed along the path that had been developing prior to Smith. By that I mean that RFRA will be held to
incorporate a narrow view of "substantial burden," one that re-

181.

Without question, Senator Simpson's separate statement in the Senate Re-

port, in which he expresses "serious concern about [the Act's] application to claims
brought by prison inmates," S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1992), is far
more detailed than the Committee's more cursory analysis. Compare id. at 9-11
(Committee analysis) with id. at 18-38 (Senator's Simpson's analysis and supporting
documents). But even the Committee discussion comes to a conclusion on the freedom
versus security question, and Senator Simpson's expression simply adds to the sense
that the Senate examined and debated competing factual predicates for RFRA.
182. Congressional factfinding superiority is the most prominent rationale in the
decisions and commentary supporting an expansive power of Congress to revise Supreme Court decisions on matters of individual constitutional rights. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
653 (1966); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980); see also Burt,
supra note 3, at 128; Cox, Role, supra note 3, at 209-10; Monaghan, supra note 3, at
28; Choper, supra note 3, at 308-09; Estreicher, supra note 3, at 355.
183. Recall that the legislative history suggests more judicial deference to prison
administrators than to civilian administrators under section 1(b) of RFRA, but less
deference to prison administrators under RFRA than under the prevailing judge-made
rule in O'Lone. Had Smith never been decided, I think the case for congressional
power to overturn O'Lone and bring prisoners closer to the Court-set norm in civil
society would be very strong.
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quires a strenuous form of coercion and a weighty impact on a
matter of religious obligation. Courts on their own and without
Smith might have loosened the concept of burden, but doing so
in the RFRA context will inevitably expand the number of situations in which RFRA's burden of justification will apply. To the
extent there is constitutional doubt concerning congressional
power to protect religious exercise so strenuously, a narrow view
of the "burden" trigger will reduce the number of occasions in
which federal law will preempt state policy."
The most serious question of statutory construction occurs at
the precise place in which Smith is ousted; that is, in section
1(b)'s restoration of some version of the compelling interest test
in cases in which religious exercise is harmed by the application
of religion-neutral rules.'8 5 Here, there is no way to finesse the
Marbury problem; Smith explicitly rejects this test as controlling
when religion is harmed by generally applicable rules, and RFRA
reinstates it. Either RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the
states qua states, or RFRA successfully replaces the Court's
current rule with some version of its prior one.
On this point, however, the conflict between coordinate
branches over the meaning of the Constitution provides a rare
opportunity for institutional reconciliation and forward movement in the protection of religious liberty. Courts should not
inevitably respond to conflict of this sort by either total capitulation or total invalidation. The former risks altering a delicate
constitutional balance; the latter unnecessarily exacerbates insti-

184. Of course, the Supreme Court could overrule Smith and thereby make the
Marbury problem go away. If that were to occur, much of the federalism problem
would go away with it. One implication of my analysis is that overruling Smith
would be a very good idea, and here I keep company with Justice Souter. Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2247-50 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, and urging reconsideration of Smith.) Professor Conkle argues that the Court should invalidate RFRA,
and then overrule Smith. Conkle, supra note 3, at 93. Although the votes do not
appear to be there to do so, I think it preferable to overrule Smith first, leaving
RFRA as constitutional insofar as it restores the law on the eve of Smith. Were
Smith to be overruled, the Court could construe RFRA's section 1 to coincide with
the constitutional law of free exercise as it existed on Smith's eve. In any event,
Professor Conkle's scenario brings him out in exactly the same place as my proposed
narrowing construction of RFRA section 1(b).
185. If the rule whose application harms religion is driven, covertly or otherwise,
by hostility to religion, the compelling interest test is applicable as a matter of constitutional law. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.
Ct. 2217 (1993) (city ordinance motivated by desire to suppress animal sacrifices of
the Santeria religion is not narrowly tailored to achieve compelling interests and is
unconstitutional).
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tutional conflict. The judicial search should be for a middle way,
through which the constitutional quest for a sensible free exercise jurisprudence may continue.18
Viewed in this light, the most recent (pre-Smith) version of
the compelling interest test has much to commend it as a construction of RFRA section 1(b). That version represents the cumulative law on the eve of Smith, and the least dramatic change
in the law would occur if RFRA merely erases Smith,'87 returning the state of legal affairs to that which existed on the day
before Smith was decided, rather than to the high-water mark of
free exercise as established in 1972,188 or to the still higher

mark that a literal construction of section 1(b)(2) might create. 89
The state of affairs on the eve of Smith included a narrow
view of burdens and "the compelling interest test as set forth in
prior federal court rulings,"9 ° rather than the "compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner ...

and Wisconsin

v. Yoder.... 191 That is, in revising its findings at the 11th
hour to move its reference to the "compelling interest test" away
from the high-water mark and toward the low mark as it stood
in 1990, Congress may have both diluted the Act and managed
to save it. Erasure of Smith, without full restoration of all the
religion-protecting capacity of free exercise principles as they
stood in 1972, is without question a change in the legal status

186.
For a general view of Court-Congress interaction consistent with that expressed in text, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme
Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REV. 26, 35 (1994)
(arguing that law as produced by interaction among branches of government "is superior to law as it might be produced by a single institution").
187.
The erasure referred to in text involves only the doctrine in Smith. The
result in Smith, recognizing state power to prohibit ritual use of peyote by American
Indians, has already been erased by a different Act of Congress, Pub. L. 103-344,
enacted almost a year after RFRA's enactment. See supra note 6.
188. This is the position taken in the "Additional Views" of Representative Henry
Hyde and others, attached to the House Judiciary Committee Report on RFRA. See
H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1992) ([As changed in the Committee
markup in September 1992], "the bill does not reinstate the free exercise standard to
the high water mark as found in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, but
merely returns the law to the state as it existed prior to Smith."). The "Additional
Views" then misstates one of these changes, by claiming that the Act's reference to
"prior federal court rulings" occurs in the "Purposes" section, rather than, as is the
case, in the "Findings" section. Id. See supra part II.C.
189. See supra part II.C.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5). This is the last in the enumeration of the
"Findings" in RFRA.
191.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). This is the first in the enumeration of the "Purposes" of RFRA.
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quo of states. In terms of the scope of the change, however, and
the threat the change presents to reliance interests and other
substantive concerns of states, such an erasure may be quite
moderate and incremental.
The implications of this approach to construction of section
1(b) of RFRA are serious and only partly predictable. Viewed
narrowly, a roll-back of the law to 1990 would preserve the current posture of automatic rejection of religious exercise claims
against tax law provisions, state and federal.192 More generally,
a return to the status quo, circa 1990, would lead to an approach
like that in Lee and Bob Jones, in which religious liberty was
weighed against state interests in gross, rather than at the margin.193 And the requirement of "least restrictive means" in section 1(b)(2) would be toned down to mean, in effect, that the
government must tailor its means to accommodate religious
exercise so long as the accommodation does not significantly
impair the government's legitimate purposes.194
If all this were to follow from a search for a narrow, saving
construction of RFRA, where would we be? First, even in the
legal universe described, Congress would have altered noticeably
the direction of the law of religious liberty. RFRA claims would
prevail less often on a narrow construction than on a broad one,
but courts would still have to struggle with the tension between
following general law and accommodating religious practice, and
could not take Smith's easy path away from that tension. In
prison cases, in particular, courts would be obliged to return to
their pre-O'Lone practices of testing with some care the security
justifications for religious restrictions on prisoners.195
192.
See supra part I.C.
193. See supra part I.C. A 1990 view of RFRA would thus suggest that the district court rather than the appeals court took the correct approach in Cheema. See
supra text accompanying notes 123-29. It is at least plausible that such an approach
may ultimately produce the kind of flexibility that leads courts to a sliding scale of
the burden of justification, by which the (judicially perceived) most significant impacts on religion may be met with the most strenuous version of section 1(b). In
these cases, and these only, the requirement that the government demonstrate that
it has no alternative means, less burdensome to religion but otherwise adequate to
its goals, may be vigorously applied. Of course, judgments about the degree of impact
on religion are notoriously difficult and, some argue, inappropriate for courts. Compare Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (courts may not
adjudicate the "centrality" of a practice to a religious community or person) with id.
at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (although "centrality" judgments may be inappropriate, courts need not "turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State's restrictions
on the adherents of a minority religion.").
194. Compare the broader possibilities for "least restrictive means" canvassed in
supra part II.C.
195. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on RFRA sets out this possi-

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995

53

Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 8

224

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Second, whatever the starting place, it is hard to imagine
any mode of construction for RFRA's section 1 other than the
dynamic.196 RFRA's subject matter and terms give it a quasiconstitutional character; that is, the Act is effectively unrepealable and destined to take on new meaning over time. The difference between broad construction (1972) and narrow construction
(1990) thus comes down to a matter of stare decisis. The broad
construction erases eighteen years of decisions inimical to free
exercise, and creates a maximally pro-liberty slate on which to
write, while the narrow version (1990) leaves in place a set of
hostile decisions which post-RFRA courts must follow, distinguish or overrule. But the 1972 legal state can become the 1990
legal state (it once did), and the 1990 legal state may eventually
resemble the 1972 legal state. The latter result requires only
time and a certain judicial inclination.
Of course, the difference between the 1972 and the 1990
versions seems to be one of degree, which Congress perhaps may
alter, while the difference between the standard of Smith and
the standard of RFRA (construed weakly or strongly) seems to be
one of kind. The constitutional doubts about whether Congress
may legislate in this context to change the standard in kind may
for some appear overwhelming. For those who so believe, the
suggestion that RFRA can be saved by adopting the 1990 version
of free exercise law as the Act's starting place will ring a disingenuous note.
My response to that concern is that the proposed limiting
construction of RFRA is driven by considerations of prudence. A
mild RFRA seems preferable to none at all, if those are the likely
choices. Upholding RFRA in such a form weakens any argument
that Congress can revise willy nilly the Court's interpretations of
the Constitution. Moreover, upholding RFRA so construed is a
way of turning Court-Congress conflict into a platform for CourtCongress cooperation. Religious liberty will fare much better if
we can turn our attention to how best to protect it, and end the
spitting match over which branch of government has the authority to do so.
Finally, the approach I have charted resides in the middle

bility with some care, including citations to particular circuit court decisions which
the Report viewed favorably. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 & nn.24 and
27 (1992).
196.
See generally William Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) (arguing that some statutes acquire new meaning over time,
and should not be frozen in a mold determined by the intent of enactors).
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ground of the debate about the extent of appropriate judiciallegislative partnership at times of legal ferment. Institutional
struggles of this character are hardly new to American law.
Judges once had to choose between fighting back against legislative overruling of common law decisions under the banner of
"strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law,"
and welcome acceptance of legislative change under the very
different slogan of "broad construction of remedial statutes."
RFRA will force judges to make, at the constitutional level, the
same sort of choice that the earlier conflict forced at the
subconstitutional level. On matters of policy of the sort addressed by the common law, we now clearly recognize legislative
supremacy. On matters of constitutional principle, we have long
recognized something very close to judicial supremacy. RFRA
may force reexamination of that institutional premise as nothing
before it ever has.
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